Satan and Demons in the Apostolic Fathers:

A Response to ‘Then the Devil Left’ by J. Burke

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Abstract

J. Burke has recently published a 50-page study online entitled Then the Devil Left: Satan’s lack of presence in the Apostolic Fathers.¹ Burke conducts exegesis of individual texts within a “taxonomic analysis” in order to judge how ‘mythological’ they are, pertaining specifically to Satan and demons. This study interacts with Burke’s methodology and exegesis. In contrast to Burke’s minimalistic findings, the conclusion herein is that the majority of the AF (certainly Barnabas, 1Clement, Hermas, Polycarp, Martyrdom of Polycarp, Ignatius, 2Clement, and plausibly Didache, Papias, and Epistle to Diognetus) refer to a mythological Satan figure. Other evil beings (e.g., demons, spirits and angels) are a less prominent feature but are present in Barnabas, Hermas, Ignatius and Papias at least. None of the AF deny belief in any of these phenomena. Collectively, these texts witness to Christian belief in supernatural evil in geographically diverse areas of the Roman Empire during the period from the late first century to mid second century CE. This is broadly consistent with the picture of early Christianity that emerges from the NT documents.

¹ Burke 2015.
1. Title and Introduction

Burke’s full title, *Then the Devil Left: Satan’s lack of presence in the Apostolic Fathers*, conveys the idea of the devil’s absence from the AF, and his abstract confirms this assessment, stating that “Satan is almost completely absent from the Apostolic Fathers.” This is a surprising summary statement. If by “Satan” we are to understand the concept denoted by the word Satan, then this statement contradicts Burke’s own findings, since he acknowledges that several of the AF refer to this concept. If by “Satan” we are to understand only the Greek word ἅταν, then the point only indicates the writers’ preference for other designations, and contributes nothing to his claim of “an early Christian tradition which rejected supernatural evil”.

Burke’s abstract further states that “neither demons, nor demon possession and exorcism, are referred to” in the Apostolic Fathers. This too contradicts Burke’s own analysis, which acknowledges that two of the AF (Ignatius and Hermas) use forms of the word ‘demon’. Burke does not think these instances refer to demons in the sense of independent supernatural beings; nevertheless, his claim should be qualified accordingly.

The third major claim in the abstract is, “More significant than mere absence is evidence of deliberate theological exclusion of satan and demons”. His paper makes serious attempts to argue this point only in the cases of the Didache and 1Clement, yet from this evidence he is able to make a synthesis that “most of the [AF] writers belonged to an early Christian tradition which rejected supernatural evil as an explanation for temptation, sin, and suffering.” This conclusion, in turn, appears to contradict his subsequent statement that supernatural evil was rejected only “in a few cases”. One is therefore struck by the distance between the exegetical findings in the body of Burke’s paper (even if they are assumed arguendo to be valid) and the conclusions expressed in his title and abstract.

Burke highlights the “significant development in the role of supernatural evil within Christian theology” in Christian texts from the mid-second century onwards. However, such developments are arguably no more than the synthesizing and systematizing of mythological elements present in earlier Christian traditions. For instance, Martin (cited by Burke on second-century development of Christian ideas about angels and demons) acknowledges that “the different elements of the later belief that Satan is the prince of fallen angels who are identical with demons” are present in the Synoptic Gospels collectively.

Burke criticizes the common “atomistic studies focusing merely on individual instances of satanological terminology without considering the broader textual and socio-historical context”. He complains that such studies typically rely on Gokey without further analysis. Since Burke thereby recognizes Gokey’s

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2 Burke 2015: 1.
3 If this was the intention, one would have expected Burke to write ‘Satan’ in inverted commas. And, even then, at least three AF used this term, which does not equate to “almost completely absent”.
4 Note also that he overlooks the reference to demons in Barn 16.7.
6 Burke 2015: 3.
study as the standard work on Satanology and demonology in the AF, the reader anticipates extensive critical interaction with Gokey, but is in for a disappointment: Burke never again refers to his work.  

This seems to be part of a broader failure to take stock of the relevant scholarship. For instance, although his study contains a substantial bibliography, Burke appears to have consulted just three journal articles.

### 2. Hermeneutical approach

Next Burke explains his hermeneutical approach, namely “taxonomic analysis”. What is remarkable about this section is that, while the body of Burke’s essay contains no less than 275 footnotes over 43 pages (about six footnotes per page), the majority of which cite scholarly sources, this crucial one-page portion in which he lays out his methodology cites no scholarship whatsoever. For all the reader knows, Burke’s “alternative approach” is completely *ad hoc* and lacking in theoretical foundation.

Burke explains that he limits the term ‘mythological’ (which he regards as synonymous with ‘cosmological’) to supernatural evil, but it is not clear why this is. Surely other supernatural beings, such as God, the exalted Christ, and angels, also point to a mythological worldview to the extent that they are held to be active in history. While it is in principle possible that early Christians could have affirmed the reality of supernatural good while denying the reality of supernatural evil, it cannot be assumed that the two are independent topics in early Christian thought. It is widely agreed that at least some of the earliest Christian writings reflect a modified cosmic dualism. By defining ‘mythological’ exclusively with reference to evil, Burke artificially separates the components of a supernatural worldview on moral grounds.

Burke’s three-pronged hermeneutic considers the taxa of “explanatory recourse”, “mythological material”, and “terminology”, each of which is used as a criterion to classify a text into one of three categories: strongly mythological, weakly mythological or non-mythological.

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7 Burke represents his study as an “alternative” to “atomistic studies focusing merely on individual instances of satanological terminology without considering the broader textual and socio-historical context” (2015: 3), but Gokey is definitely not guilty of this. Unfortunately, it appears that Burke has neglected to read Gokey’s work.

8 For instance, Dibelius describes the baptismal miracle, the wilderness temptations and the transfiguration in the Gospels as “mythological” events, because they involve “mythological” persons (Dibelius 1935/1971: 271). Of course, in two of these events, the putative mythological person is not an evil being but is God!

9 Schiavo (2002) reads the Q source in the context of a cosmic confrontation between Jesus and Satan. Kovacs interprets the texts about “the ruler of this world” in John in terms of “cosmic conflict” which is “central to Johannine dualism” (Kovacs 1995: 235). “The New Testament writings are united in their approach to supernatural evil, despite variations of emphasis among them. Specifically, they almost all maintain the existence of one evil being of particular importance, commonly called the devil or Satan” (Ferdinando 1997: 17). Lee (1970: 67) finds that Paul and his contemporaries held a primitive cosmology which depicted Jesus as the Redeemer who came to rescue “the whole cosmos from thraldom to demonic powers.” Aune’s description of the ‘apocalyptic eschatology’ of early Judaism and early Christianity includes the notion of “The ultimate defeat and judgment of evil (Satan, his demonic allies and those humans they have led astray)” (2003: 57). Russell (1987: 91) describes the New Testament worldview as “latent cosmic dualism.”
By “explanatory recourse”, Burke refers to whether God, humans, or Satan and demons are used in explaining phenomena such as sin, evil, persecution, sickness, salvation and eschatological events. He makes the crucial concession that these three recourses are “not necessarily mutually exclusive”, but unfortunately does not apply this principle enough. One could go further and say that, far from being mutually exclusive, these different recourses may be complementary. For instance, the theodicy of Job makes reference both to God and a cosmic adversary, not independently but in concert (Job 1:6-12; 2:1-7). God and a ‘spirit’ are both involved in Ahab’s downfall in 1Kgs 22. In rabbinic Judaism, Satan is identified with evil desire but remains an independent being at the same time.10 Peter explains Ananias’ sin both anthropologically and with reference to Satan (Acts 5:3-4).11 The same can be seen in Jesus’ rebuke of Peter at Caesarea Philippi (Mark 8:33).12 The hamartiology of James 1:13-15 is anthropological and yet this writer can elsewhere make recourse to the devil and demons in order to explain sin (James 3:15; 4:7).13

It will be seen that even the AF writings which Burke regards as strongly mythological (the Epistle of Barnabas and the Epistles of Ignatius) make recourse to anthropological factors to explain sin. Mythological and anthropological recourses are complementary rather than contradictory. 14 Consequently, the presence of anthropological explanations for sin or persecution in a text does not imply a marginalization of or non-belief in mythological evil on the part of its author.

The second taxon, “mythological material”, concerns the way in which a text uses mythological material. A strongly mythological text, Burke tells us, would typically demonstrate acceptance of “the existence of pagan gods, mythological beasts, and supernatural evil beings”. A weakly mythological text may “reduce the status” of the mythological referent, for instance demoting pagan deities to evil spirits or demons. A non-mythological text may “use terms and imagery from mythological source material, but such elements are typically omitted, replaced with non-mythological terms, or polemicized in a manner demonstrating the writer’s disbelief”.15

The characteristics of the “strongly mythological” category are surprising here since, to this writer’s knowledge, no text in the New Testament or Apostolic Fathers acknowledges the existence of pagan

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10 Reeg 2013: 79.
11 See Peterson (2009: 209-210): “The language of ‘filling’ is normally associated with the presence of the Holy Spirit or with the graces and gifts supplied by the Spirit (e.g., 2:4; 4:8, 31; 6:3, 5, 8; 7:55; 9:17; 11:24; 13:9), though the specific verb employed here (eplērōsen) is only so used in 13:52. Rather than being filled with the fruit of the Spirit, the heart of Ananias was filled by Satan with deceit and hypocrisy (cf. 8:23; 13:10)... The Evil One is regarded as the ultimate cause of this attack on the unity and holiness of the church, but Ananias is clearly responsible for his actions.”
12 See Dochhorn 2013: 99, who argues that this text presupposes a “Satanology of inspiration.”
13 Wilson (2002: 163) remarks that in the logic of Jas 1:14-15 and 4:5-7, “the internal conflict with desire can be seen to correlate with an external conflict against the devil and his ‘evils’”
14 Riches (2001: 41) argues that Mark’s narrative “intertwines” two distinct views of evil: one cosmological (mythological) and the other forensic (anthropological). Indeed, “neither of the prevailing explanations, cosmic dualist or forensic, will adequately account for the experience of the community” (2001: 48). Both are needed. If this was true for Mark’s community, we should not be surprised to find both perspectives simultaneously present in other early Christian literature.
15 Burke 2015: 3-4.
gods as such. The early church’s two explanatory recourses for pagan theology were to deny the existence of the gods and to assert that pagan religion is animated by demons who are no gods. These recourses are again not mutually exclusive and both can be used by the same writer (see below under ‘The Didache’s silence on demons’). The latter recourse is mythological (and not “weakly” so), while the former is not mythological but is still consistent with a mythological worldview.

Moreover, Burke’s reference to the use of terms and imagery from mythological source material is relevant only where the writer’s sources are known or can plausibly be reconstructed (e.g., the Two Ways material in Didache and Barnabas).

Burke’s third taxon is “Terminology”. Now, one would naturally understand ‘terminology’ to mean the terms which a writer uses, but Burke is interested in how a text uses specific terms. He states that “A text exhibiting strong mythological belief will use terms with an explicit mythological referent; words such as diabolos will explicitly or even exclusively refer to a supernatural evil being”.\(^\text{16}\) This criterion is problematic in two ways. Firstly, it fails to appreciate that terms like ‘devil’, ‘demon’ and ‘angel’, as used in the early church, were \textit{intrinsically mythological}.\(^\text{17}\) If the early church used these words as technical terms for mythological beings, then the mere use of the term is sufficient to denote a mythological referent. (Burke himself admits the existence of “several standard satanological terms”\(^\text{18}\) in an early Christian context, and presumably he would allow that ὁ διάβολος was one of these.) If an early Christian writer refers to ὁ διάβολος without elaborating on what he means, it would be more logical to conclude that he used the term with its usual mythological referent than that he sought to divorce it from its mythological background. It is a writer who sought to de-mythologize the terms who would need to be explicit about his intention. Hence, the burden of proof lies with Burke to establish that such terminology is used in the AF with non-mythological referents.

Burke states that a weakly mythological text would use terminology such as διάβολος polyvalently or ambiguously. The claim regarding polyvalence does not necessary hold;\(^\text{19}\) and ‘ambiguity’ makes for a subjective criterion: what is ambiguous to Burke was not necessarily ambiguous to early Christians!

Finally, Burke holds that a non-mythological text would avoid terms with a unique supernatural referent. The underlying assumption here is that designations such as ὁ διάβολος, ὁ πονηρός and ὁ σατανᾶς are not such. Burke further argues that “terms which could have either a mythological or non-mythological referent (such as διάβολος), will be used explicitly and exclusively of non-mythological referents”. Here one observes the failure to distinguish between the definite and indefinite use of

\(^\text{16}\) Burke 2015: 4.
\(^\text{17}\) So, for instance, Bultmann (1941/1989: 1): “The world picture of the New Testament is a mythical world picture... a theatre for the working of supernatural powers, God and his angels, Satan and his demons”. We can also note grammarian Wallace’s (1996: 222-224) assertion that διαβολος in the NT is a monadic noun meaning ‘devil’.
\(^\text{18}\) Burke 2015: 8.
\(^\text{19}\) The author of the Pastoral Epistles can use διάβολος as a plural adjective for humans (1Tim. 3:11; 2Tim. 3:3; Tit. 2:3) while also using ὃ διάβολος for the devil (1Tim. 3:6-7; 2Tim. 2:26). Luke can use ἄγγελος of human messengers (Luke 7:24; 7:27; 9:52) even though he normally uses it as a technical term meaning ‘angel’. Neither of these writers, in so doing, betrays a weakly mythological worldview.
It is lexically possible that a non-mythological author could use a term like ὁ διάβολος with a non-mythological referent, but one can agree with Burke that he would need to be explicit about it. A non-mythological author would be more likely to use such terminology only to reject it, if he used it at all.

This last point draws our attention to a gap in Burke’s taxonomical framework. The decisive indicator of a non-mythological view of evil would be explicit repudiation of mythological evil; for instance, a statement denying the existence of Satan and/or demons. While such a denial may exist in Sir 21.27, and while the Sadducees’ skepticism concerning the spirit world (Acts 23:8) suggests they did not believe in Satan or demons, there is no evidence of such denials within first- or second-century Christianity. This is all the more remarkable in view of Burke’s claim that ‘mythological Christianity’ arose in the early second century and co-existed with the earlier ‘demythological Christianity’ until the former “became dominant from the mid-second century onwards.”

If early second century Christianity was characterised by two sharply different views on supernatural evil, we would expect to find evidence of controversy. We would expect to find representatives of ‘mythological Christianity’ making arguments in favour of the existence of Satan and demons, and representatives of ‘demythological Christianity’ making counterarguments. Instead, references to Satan and demons are consistently made in passing, as though referring to a generally accepted idea which needs no justification.

However, the absence of such evidence is a secondary point here. The main issue is that Burke’s taxonomic framework omits the antithesis of a ‘strongly mythological’ worldview from its very structure. A truly comprehensive framework would include a category for texts which explicitly deny the existence of Satan and demons and are therefore anti-mythological. One surmises that such a category is omitted from Burke’s framework because he has designed it to fit the data, which he knows contains no such anti-mythological material.

Finally, a brief comment about presuppositions. Burke’s consistently minimalistic reading of Satan and demons in the AF is more understandable (but not more persuasive) when one takes into account that he has a confessional commitment to non-mythological exegesis of Satan in the Bible.

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20 The failure to appreciate the significance of the definite article is a recurring feature of Burke’s exegesis.
21 As argued by numerous scholars: Boccaccini (2002: 138-139); Kelly (2006: 75); Sacchi (1990: 223); Sacchi (2004: 350-351). In this writer’s view a polemic against belief in Satan is a possible interpretation of Sir 21.27, but not the only one. For instance, the writer could be warning against blaming one’s sins on ‘Satan’ (however this figure was understood in this pre-Christian Sitz im Leben), perhaps on the grounds that Satan is an angel of God who merely serves to activate the evil impulse already present in the human heart.
22 Burke 2015: 43.
23 Burke (2015: 5) does refer to the Didache as “anti-mythological,” but not within his taxonomic framework. As will be seen, this is in any case an exaggeration since the Didache shows no explicit antagonism toward a mythological view of reality.
24 Burke is a Christadelphian. The Christadelphian Statement of Faith affirms total biblical inspiration and inerrancy, but also requires members of the group to “reject the doctrine — that the devil is a supernatural being.” See http://www.christadelphia.org/basf.htm and http://www.christadelphia.org/reject.htm. Christadelphiens do not
3. Exegesis of the Apostolic Fathers

3.1. Didache

Burke’s exegesis of the Didache is really the lynchpin of his overall argument, so it is not surprising that he places it first. However, while he offers some useful insights, his conclusions go beyond the evidence and are largely conjectural.

3.1.1. The omission of angels in the Didache’s Two Ways material

Burke first treats the Didache’s Two Ways material, which (in contrast to other borrowers of such material, such as the Epistle of Barnabas, the Doctrina Apostolorum, and the Manual of Discipline) does not set the two ways within the context of angelic dualism. Burke states,

the Didache has completely removed any reference to satan and his angels. This deliberate anti-mythological approach is followed consistently throughout the Didache.

This assessment contains multiple dubious claims. In stating that the Didache has “removed” any reference to Satan, Burke assumes without argument that the Didache’s Two Ways source made reference to Satan. However, van de Sandt & Flusser’s reconstruction of the hypothetical Two Ways source closely follows the Doctrina in its opening sentence, referring to “two angels...one of righteousness, the other of iniquity”, but not to Satan. Reference to Satan occurs in the Two Ways material of Barnabas (18.1), but Draper argues that this addition was made by the author of Barnabas.

Niederwimmer states that “It can no longer be said with certainty” whether the Didache’s source contained cosmic dualism, or whether this had already been removed in an ‘upstream’ recension. Nevertheless, the likelihood that the original Two Ways tractate contained cosmic dualism which is no longer present in the Didache is widely recognized. The question that detains us is why the two angels were removed. Burke (again) assumes without argument that this was (1) done deliberately and (2) motivated by an “anti-mythological” theological outlook. However, the reality is that we do not know why the ‘two angels’ motif was removed. On the Didachist’s theology in general, Niederwimmer offers the following caveat:

His book tells us little or nothing of his ‘theology,’ if he had one at all. It is written without any theoretical claims and is entirely focused on the praxis and order of community life. Individual theological motifs are evident, but only in passing and without systematic reflection. A

regard the AF as having any authority, but it is nevertheless in the interest of their apologetics that belief in Satan and demons be pushed as late into the Christian era as possible. The present writer is a former Christadelphian whose exegetical studies led him to adopt a mythological reading of Satan and demons in early Christian texts.

26 Draper 1995a: 98, 102.
reconstruction of the ‘theology of the Didache’ would therefore be a foolish enterprise. All we can say is that attention should be paid to the author’s fundamentally conservative stance.29

Burke’s dogmatic claims contrast with the cautiousness of this leading authority on the Didache.

Van de Sandt & Flusser give two possible explanations for the omission of the two angels:

The absence of these elements from the Didache might have occurred by accident in the course of transmission or might have been the result of a deliberate attempt to ethicize the tradition.30

Hence, it is not even certain that the omission of the two angels was deliberate. Most scholars hold that it was, but give different explanations for the motivation. Niederwimmer simply states that the two angels motif may have been omitted “because it plays no part in the exposition that follows”. 31 He further notes that there are “other examples of the two-ways schema that are not combined with the teaching on the two spirits or angels”,32 citing Matt. 7:13-14 and 2Pet. 2:15. In these cases, the absence of the angels is obviously not due to any aversion to supernatural evil, angelology, or mythological motifs in general, since these writers appeal to such ideas elsewhere.33

Milavec probably comes closest to Burke’s point of view. He argues that the Didache’s diminution of supernatural evil represents a pastoral strategy designed to train novice Christians to turn their backs on their previous polytheistic ways without fear of the gods’ wrath which might have ensued had the power of the gods been equated with demonic power. Milavec regards this hypothesis as consistent with the Didache’s apocalyptic ending, in which “the events associated with the Lord’s coming unfold without any angelic or demonic forces playing any role whatsoever.”34 This last assertion will be seen to be questionable in our analysis of Didache 16.4 below. However, for now we can observe that while Milavec goes further than other scholars in finding deliberate demythologization of evil throughout the Didache, he still stops short of attributing this to the writer’s anti-mythological (or even non-mythological) worldview. Instead, he links it to the pastoral purposes of the document in relation to its spiritually immature readers. This is particularly appropriate in the case of the Two Ways material which is widely recognized as a Christian adaptation of Jewish catechetical material for proselytes.35

Jenks’ explanation for the Didachist’s avoidance of evil figures in the Two Ways material is very different than that of Milavec. For Jenks, it serves to highlight the appearance of the world-deceiver in the apocalyptic ending (whom he regards as having satanic connections).36 Chester concurs that by avoiding

33 E.g., Matt 4:1-11; 25:41; 2Pet 2:4
36 Jenks 1990: 308, 310.
eschatology in the Two Ways teaching, the Didachist has made the eschatological ending “to be the climax of his work.”

A significant number of scholars regard the Didache’s ‘de-angelologization’ of the Two Ways as a deliberate ethicizing or demythologizing move. However, like Milavec, these scholars tend to explain the motivation for the omission in terms of the redactor’s didactic purpose rather than his theological position. A reluctance to discuss angelology with spiritually immature readers is also seen in IgnTral 5.1-2 (on which see below) which indisputably comes from an author with a mythological worldview.

Importantly, to my knowledge no scholar has argued that the Didache’s Two Ways material omits the two angels because the Didachist disbelieved in supernatural evil. And for good reason: we will see that at least two other texts in the Didache (8.2 and 16.4) may well presuppose such beliefs.

Moreover, Burke has apparently failed to observe that it is not angelic evil specifically that has been omitted in Did 1.1, but angels both good and evil. Indeed, the extant text of the Didache makes no reference to angels at all. Although Did 16.7 quotes from Zech. 14:5 LXX, where the ἅγιοι are angels, it is almost universally agreed that the Didachist has understood these ἅγιοι to be the resurrected saints. It is possible that the Didache’s lost ending (on which see below) mentioned angels. However, this is uncertain; for instance, Garrow’s reconstruction of the Didache’s lost ending does not mention angels.

Thus, if one is going to argue from the de-angelologization of Did 1.1 that the Didachist disbelieved in bad angels, one might as well argue that he disbelieved in angels entirely. While it is theoretically possible that some ex-Sadducees might have brought their skepticism regarding the spirit world to bear upon early Jewish Christian communities, there is no other evidence of any early Christians who rejected the existence of angels. Accordingly, it is best to conclude that the Didache’s ‘demythologization’ of the Two Ways material was motivated by a desire to simplify the ethical teaching for Gentile initiates. It is possible that the Didachist was relatively disinterested in angelology or cosmic dualism, but it is unlikely that the Didache reflects an early Christian community which had abandoned belief in angels or supernatural evil.

3.1.2. ὁ πονηρός in the Didache version of the Lord’s Prayer

We now turn to Did 8.2, a version of the Lord’s Prayer which “agrees strongly with the one handed on by Matthew, with some characteristic deviations from the latter”. The consensus concerning the relationship between Matthew and the Didache is that the two writers drew on shared tradition but

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38 In addition to Jefford (1989: 27) and Van de Sandt & Flusser (2002: 63), who regard this as one of two possibilities (apparently the more likely possibility in Van de Sandt & Flusser’s case – 2002: 119), this position is held by Suggs (1972: 71), Draper (1983: 19), and Kloppenborg (1995: 99f). The latter describes the Didachist’s redactional tendencies as “Torahizing.”
40 Garrow 2009: 203-204.
have no literary dependence on one another. Accordingly the agreements in the Lord’s Prayer are held to “rest on a common liturgical tradition”.

The petition that interests us is identical in Matt 6:13 and Did 8.2 (but absent from Luke 11:2-4): ἀλλὰ ῥύσαι ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τοῦ πονηροῦ. In Matthew, probably a majority scholars regard τοῦ πονηροῦ as a reference to the evil one, i.e. Satan, and not to evil abstractly or the generic evil person (though this has been a matter of debate since the patristic period). In the Didache, scholarly opinion leans in the opposite direction, though not overwhelmingly, but no detailed study of this petition as distinct from Matt 6:13b has been made, perhaps because the consensus of literary independence is a recent development.

Burke argues that τοῦ πονηροῦ refers to generic evil rather than the Evil One. He rests this conclusion on three lines of evidence: (1) the absence of pre-Christian usage of this term for a supernatural being; (2) the Didache’s demythologizing agenda; and (3) the fact that elsewhere in the Didache there are only generic references to evil (3.1; 10.5).

In support of the alleged lack of pre-Christian witness, Burke cites Black. However, he has misread his source. He quotes Black summarizing the views of earlier scholars who rejected the masculine interpretation of ὁ πονηρός in the Matthean Lord’s Prayer because of the lack of precedent in Jewish literature. However, Black himself argues for an opposite conclusion:

> It is at 4Q286 5 that we find the Hebrew רוחב used as a proper name to describe Satan or Belial, in a text that is closely related to the 4Q Melchiresa’ texts at 4Q Amram, and 4Q280 2. *These texts not only supply an exact Hebrew equivalent of the Greek for the devil, but they*

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45 Scholars who read ‘evil’ include Bigg 1905: 412; Glimm et al 1947: 178; Milavec 2003: 312; Johnson 2009: 37; Cody 1995: 9 (who includes ‘the evil one’ as a parenthetical alternative); Niederwimmer 1998: 134 (who includes ‘the evil one’ as a parenthetical alternative); O’Neill 1993: 18-19 argues (concerning the prayer in both Matthew and the Didache) that the petition covers “the widest possible range of the evils from which a worshipper would ask God’s help in deliverance”, inclusive of both internal sources of temptation and external (such as the devil). Draper 2000: 137, refers to “the petition not to be subjected to trial but to be snatched from the evil (one)”, allowing the ambiguity to stand.
46 Scholars who read ‘the evil one’ include Ehrman 2003a: 429 (who includes ‘evil’ as a parenthetical alternative), Holmes 2007: 357; Sorensen 2002: 199 n. 82 (who notes the ambiguity); Varner 2005: 147; Lietzmann 1979: 374; Brown 1961: 206-208 (who is referring to the prayer in both Matthew and the Didache); Arndt et al 2000: 851 (who note however the possibility of an abstract referent); Collins 2002: 287 (who is referring to both Matthew and the Didache).
47 This consensus would seem to support interpreting τοῦ πονηροῦ in the same sense in Did 8.2 as in Matt. 6:13b.
also illustrate and fill out the Aramaic and Hebrew background of this classic New Testament term.\textsuperscript{49}

‘Evil ones’ in Jub 10.11; 23.29; 50.5 are regarded by some as supernatural opponents.\textsuperscript{50} A possible translation of 1En 69.15 is, “The Evil One placed this oath in Michael’s hand”.\textsuperscript{51} The claim that ‘the evil one’ has no pre-Christian usage referring to a supernatural evil being is therefore dubious. Moreover, pre-Christian usage aside, what about Christian usage? \(\text{ὁ πονηρός}\) as a designation for Satan is found in four distinct strands of Christian tradition which are roughly contemporary with the Didache: Matthean (5:37; 6:13; 13:19; 13:38), deutero-Pauline (Eph 6:16; 2Thess 3:3), Johannine (John 17:15; 1John 2:13-14; 3:12; 5:18-19), and Barnaban (Barn 2.10; 21.3). It is obvious that this term was in widespread use in the early church as a designation for Satan.\textsuperscript{52}

Besides the terminological precedent, Wold argues that this petition falls into the category of apotropaic prayer based on a comparison with prayers in the Qumran literature offered for protection against S/satan(s);\textsuperscript{53} for instance, “let not any satan have power over me”\textsuperscript{54}; “Let not Satan rule over me, nor an unclean spirit”.\textsuperscript{55}

As to the Didachist’s ‘demythologizing agenda’, we have already seen reason for caution about drawing strong conclusions in this regard. Moreover, the Didachist did not compose this prayer, and would probably not have dared to alter the wording of a liturgical form recited in his community and believed to have been “commanded by the Lord”.

Furthermore, comparison with the references to abstract evil in Did 3.1 and 10.5 actually supports a personal reading of \(\text{ὁ πονηρός}\) here. In arguing for a Satanological interpretation of Matt 6:13b, Brown pointed out, “In NT usage, when \textit{ponēros} means ‘evil’ in the abstract, the word ‘all’ usually appears before it.”\textsuperscript{56} Vögtle, meanwhile, states that if “preservation from every evil” was the sense of the Lord’s Prayer, the article should have been omitted before \(\text{πονηρός}\).\textsuperscript{57} Thus, what we find in Did 3.1 and 10.5 – references to ‘all evil’ with no article – actually \textit{contrast} with Did 8.2, increasing the likelihood that the meaning here is personal rather than generic.

\textsuperscript{49} Black 1990: 334. Emphasis added.  
\textsuperscript{50} De Bruin 2014: 166n11; Eve 2002: 169.  
\textsuperscript{52} Commenting on Barn 2.10, Russell (1987: 39n21) states, “The usage [of ho ponēros for the devil] is so established that it lends considerable weight to the argument that the ending of the Lord’s Prayer refers specifically to the Devil”.  
\textsuperscript{53} Wold forthcoming; cf. Eshel 2000; Morris 2014. Eshel identifies nine apotropaic prayers from the Second Temple Period, and also notes the apotropaic use of Num. 6:24-26 and Psalm 91 in Qumran and rabbinic literature. See also 2Bar 21.23.  
\textsuperscript{54} Aramaic Levi, 4QLev\textsuperscript{b} 10  
\textsuperscript{56} Brown 1961: 207. Cf. Matt. 5:11; 1Thess. 5:22; 2Tim. 4:18; cf. Did 3.1; 10.5. Counterexamples are Acts 28:21 and Rom. 12:9, but in both cases abstractness is clear from context.  
\textsuperscript{57} Vögtle 1978: 101.
Other tradition-historical arguments can be advanced for a Satanological interpretation of Matt 6:13b (and, by extension, Did 8.2) but they are too involved to discuss here. Suffice it to say that it is, at the very least, plausible that Did 8.2 refers to Satan. This casts significant doubt on Burke’s conclusion that the Didache represents a strongly demythologized tradition in early Christianity.

3.1.3. The Didache’s silence on demons

Burke notes the Didache’s silence on demons and exorcism, which is most notable in 6.3 where the rejection of idol food is enjoined without reference to demons. We have already referred to Milavec’s suggestion that this silence is part of a pastoral strategy for the Gentile initiates for whom the Two Ways teaching is intended. It does not necessarily represent a full theology of idolatry. We will see later that the author of the Epistle to Diognetus, writing to a non-believer, explicitly states that he is withholding some of his ideas about idolatry (Diog 2.10). Moreover, the fact that the Didachist describes idols as “dead gods” does not “exclude any association of idols with demons” as Burke claims. Justin Martyr similarly calls idols “lifeless and dead” but still goes on to link them to demons (1Apol 9).  

The Didache’s silence on demon-possession and exorcism does not imply that the writer held no belief in these phenomena. Sorensen notes a number of ambiguous passages which he suggests may allude to demons (in addition to those discussed herein, Did 3.1; 6.1; 10.5).  

Burke notes how the Didache differentiates between true and false prophets without suggesting that they are speaking with two different spirits (a divine spirit and a demonic spirit). He cites Tibbs, who notes that both true and false prophets speak ἐν πνεύματι according to Did 11.7-12 and states

Nothing in the pertinent texts suggests that for the true prophet ἐν πνεύματι should translate ‘in the Spirit’ and for the false prophet ἐν πνεύματι should translate ‘in a spirit,’ indicating a spirit other than ‘the Spirit’ or ‘the Holy Spirit’.  

Burke thus concludes, “Both the true and false prophet are using the same spirit.” This, however, is not the point Tibbs is making. Tibbs is not arguing that both true and false prophet are using the same spirit, i.e. the Holy Spirit. Rather, he is arguing that ἐν πνεύματι, both here and in Paul, can be translated literally as “in [a] spirit.” Thus reference is not being made to a specific spirit used by both true and

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58 Horsley (2004: 127) discusses the two Jewish traditional polemics against idolatry. One (found especially in Hellenistic Jewish literature such as Bel and the Dragon, Wisdom, and Philo), “contrasts lifeless idols (along with the ‘ignorance’ in which idolatry is based) with the one, true, creating and redeeming God (along with ‘knowledge of Him’)”. The other tradition, on which Paul drew, “although it agreed that idols are ‘nothings’ and lifeless human products, saw in idolatry the service or the influence of demons (Jub. 2.4-6; 22.16-22; 1 En. 19; 99.6-10; T.Naph. 3.3-4)”. Thus both polemical strategies agreed on the lifelessness of idols, so the declaration in Did 6.3, while obviously more in line with the former strategy, shows no hint of opposition to the latter. Meecham (1949: 33), commenting on the similar silence in the Epistle to Diognetus, states, “That both views could be held in the mind without a sense of conflict may be seen in Paul.”

59 Sorensen 2002: 199n82.

60 Tibbs 2007: 317-318.

61 Burke 2015: 7.

false prophets; rather, the text presumes that both true and false prophets are in some sense spirit-possessed: “All of the statements [in Did 11.7-12] are uttered by a prophet ἐν πνεύματι, indicating that a foreign spirit is speaking through the prophet.”63 In a footnote to this statement, Tibbs favourably cites Richardson’s view that in the Didache, “λαλοῦντα ἐν πνεύματι means ‘literally, speaking in a spirit, i.e. speaking while possessed by a divine or demonic spirit.’”64 Burke’s own interpretation of ἐν πνεύματι in Did 11.7-12 is at odds with the source he cites to support it.

Moreover, Burke’s interpretation of ἐν πνεύματι in Did 11.7-12 contradicts Paul’s use of this phrase. Did 11.12 asserts that a person can say things ἐν πνεύματι like “Give me money”. However, Paul states that “no one speaking in the Spirit of God (ἐν πνεύματι θεοῦ) ever says ‘Jesus is accursed!’” (1Cor 12:3). Both writers give an example of an evil thing that a spirit-possessed person might hypothetically say. Paul says one speaking in the Spirit of God could not say such a thing, while the Didache says that one speaking ἐν πνεύματι could say such a thing but should not be heeded. If, by ἐν πνεύματι, the Didache uniformly means “in the Spirit of God”, this would contradict Paul’s claim. However, if the Didache’s ἐν πνεύματι simply means “in a spirit”, referring to spirit possession65 without specifying which spirit, this would open the possibility that the false prophet speaks in an evil spirit, and there is no contradiction with Paul.

Of course, it is possible that Paul and the Didachist had different views of the spirit world. Burke points out that the Didache advocates using behaviour rather than discernment of spirits to differentiate between true and false prophets. In this respect the Didache is like Matthew (7:15-20) but unlike Paul (1Cor 12:10) and John (1John 4:1-6). However, it is not clear, as Burke claims, that the Didache urges this approach because true and false prophets are using the same spirit. In fact, the Shepherd of Hermas also offers behaviour as a criterion for distinguishing between true and false prophets,66 in a passage which asserts that false prophets are filled with the devil’s spirit (HermMan 11.3f).67 Rather, the Didache advocates a behavioural approach because true prophecy is held in very high esteem and the possibility of wrongly opposing it is regarded very seriously (Did 11.7).68

Some do translate ἐν πνεύματι in Did 11.7-12 as “in the Spirit”, implying the Holy Spirit69. Milavec describes this as “speaking in spirit/Spirit” and observes, “The exact nature of such speaking is not

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63 Tibbs 2007: 222.
64 Tibbs 2007: 222n26. The citation is from Richardson 1970/1995: 176n64.
65 Callan (1985: 126) states, “it seems clear that NT prophecy is a matter of spirit possession”.
66 Osiek (1999: 143) notes two criteria mentioned by Hermas to identify false prophets. The first is that they “give oracles to consulters,” i.e. only after they have been solicited by other people. She adds, “But there is yet another, time-honored criterion by which to test or discern (δοκιμάζειν) the true prophet, the criterion that places this discussion firmly within the early Christian tradition of discernment of prophecy: from the prophet’s way of life.”
67 The idea that false prophets are filled with the spirit of the devil is also found in Justin, Dial 82.2-3.
68 De Halleux (1995: 308) states, “So great is [the Didachist’s] respect for the charism, that the diakrisis of any true prophet is held to be unforgivable sin, that is to say it represents the sin against the Spirit (11:7; cf. Mt 12:31).”
-defined; hence, it can be assumed that this was well known to the hearers of the Didache." 70 Thompson simply describes the false prophets of Did 11.8, 12 as “spirit possessed.” 71

De Halleux offers a direct challenge to Burke’s view that all references to ἐν πνεύματι in Did 11.7-12 refer to the same spirit, i.e. the Holy Spirit:

But what is meant by speaking ἐν πνεύματι (11:7-12)? It is apparently not the Holy Spirit, warranted by the tradition, that he designates by this formula, since he also affirms that the false prophet speaks in a spirit in the same way (11:8; 11:12), perhaps under the inspiration of demons who knew the future and the hidden things; hence the caution of the translators, who write here ‘esprit’ (‘spirit’) without a capital.” 72

There is other early Christian evidence for the idea that false prophets and teachers were inspired or possessed by spirits other than the (or a) Holy Spirit (1John 4:1-13; 1Tim 4:1; HermMan 11.1-3). 1Cor 12:10 may also presuppose such an idea. While it is not entirely clear what Paul means by ‘discernment of spirits’ here, patristic exegesis of this text was dominated by the idea that demonic spirits had to be identified and distinguished from good spirits. 74 Draper states the following on λαλούντα ἐν πνεύματι in Did 11:

CD 12:2f envisages a man speaking under the dominion (משל) of Belial, the Spirit of Darkness, and the true prophet would no doubt speak under the dominion of the Spirit of Light. All mankind is under the dominion of one or the other. This understanding may well be what lies behind the expression in Did. Herm., Mand. XI.3 envisages the devil filling the ‘empty’ false prophet with his spirit. The congregation, on the other hand, prays to God, who responds by filling the true prophet with his Spirit (XI.9). 76

In summary, Burke’s conclusion, “There is no suggestion that supernatural evil of any kind motivates the words and actions of the false prophet”, 77 is based on an inadequate analysis of ἐν πνεύματι in this text. While the Didache does not explicitly state that false prophets are inspired or possessed by a demonic spirit, it is certainly possible – indeed likely – that the language of Did 11.7-12 depends on such ideas.

70 Milavec 1994: 129.
71 Thompson 2004: 147n35.
72 De Halleux 1995: 309.
73 Goulder (1999: 342) writes, “John commends applying a criterion to distinguish divine from demonic spirits, ‘for many false prophets have gone out into the world’. The demonic spirits lie behind the false prophets, visiting holy men who are not part of the community.”
74 Tibbs (2008: 322) notes, “In the commentaries, the phrase ‘discernment of spirits’ is usually explained as a discernment between the Holy Spirit and other demonic spirits or human spirits.” Tibbs himself disputes that a single ‘Holy Spirit’ is in view here, but argues that Paul is referring to “a discernment of holy spirits apart from unholy spirits” (p. 323).
75 See Lienhard 1980.
76 Draper 1983: 244-245.
77 Burke 2015: 8.
3.1.4. The identity of the world-deceiver

The fourth exegetical issue to be discussed within the Didache is the identity of the world-deceiver (ὁ κοσμοπλανής) who is mentioned in the brief apocalyptic ending to this text. This is the only known occurrence of this noun in early Christian literature.78

Commenting on this text, Burke notes Peerbolte’s suggestion79 that the world-deceiver is Satan (like the Antichrist figure in Ascens 4.1f, who is Beliar incarnate),80 but rejects it as “unlikely in the extreme” on the grounds that the Didachist would not here introduce a novel term for Satan, a being whom he has not previously mentioned. The claim that Satan has not previously been mentioned is questionable in view of Did 8.2. However, more to the point, Burke’s argument ignores the fact that the Didache is a compilation of different source materials which therefore “cannot be considered a homogeneous text.”81 We have no reason to assume that the Didachist has coined the term κοσμοπλανής himself. Indeed, Burke himself quotes Peerbolte82 to the effect that the Didachist probably took the term from the tradition!

Burke largely ignores conceptual parallels in relevant Jewish and Christian literature that might illuminate the Didache’s ὁ κοσμοπλανής figure. For instance, although he refers to Niederwimmer’s commentary and his statement that ApocPet 2 forms the closest parallel, he fails to note the close terminological parallel with Rev. 12:9 (ὁ πλανῶν τὴν οἰκουμένην ὅλην, “the one deceiving the whole world”), which is noted by Niederwimmer83 and which is a description of Satan. Niederwimmer further notes numerous parallels to the idea of “The devil who alters his appearance”,84 just as the world-deceiver is manifest “as (ὁς) a son of God”. Again, Niederwimmer notes numerous parallels to the idea of an eschatological figure who deceives using signs and wonders.85 Finally he notes several other texts containing parallels to the concept of deceiving the world.86 Having failed to take note of all of this evidence, Burke also neglects to mention Niederwimmer’s own view that the Didache’s world-deceiver is a “diabolical” and “demonic” figure.87

78 So Lampe 1961: 770. The equivalent adjective κοσμοπλάνος occurs in AposCon 7.32.2, a text dependent on the Didache (see below), where it modifies τὸν διάβολον.
80 Jenks 1990: 312 does not identify the world-deceiver as Satan like Peerbolte does, but he does observe that Beliar in Ascens 4 is “very close to the tradition of the eschatological adversary in the Didache”.
84 Niederwimmer (1998: 219n6) notes the following parallels: LAE 9; 2Cor 11:14; TJob 6.4; Apoc. Elijah 3.16-18; Hippolytus De Antichr. 6.
86 In addition to those already mentioned, he notes 2John 7; 2Thess. 2:3-4; Justin Dial. 110.2; Sib. Or. 3.68 (Niederwimmer 1998: 211n2).
Burke further notes Jenks’ view that the world-deceiver is a figure with satanic connections, but contrasts this with a table later in Jenks’ work which cross-tabulates certain characteristics of the Antichrist figure with various early texts. In this table, Jenks does not tick Didache as text in which the Antichrist figure has a Satanic link. In personal communication with this author, Jenks explained that the check marks in the table “indicate the explicit presence of particular themes related to the Antichrist tradition.” Hence he left this box un-ticked inasmuch as “There is no explicit reference to the Satan tradition in this passage (as the term is not used).” Nevertheless, as he stated in his book, he does regard the Didache’s world-deceiver as having satanic connections, specifically as “related to the Satan tradition, rather than to the False Prophet or Eschatological Tyrant traditions”.

Besides Peerbolte, others who identify the Didache’s world-deceiver with Satan include Kierspel and, seemingly, Del Verme, Thomas, and Paget. Like Niederwimmer and Jenks, Verheyden does not identify the world-deceiver as Satan but believe this figure has satanic “associations.” Sorensen regards it as “ambiguous” whether the referent is demonic. Glover and Garrett comment on parallels between Did 16.4 and other texts concerning Satan without explicitly positing an association. Draper regards the false prophets in both Did. 11 and 16 as having been sent by Satan. He discusses eschatological opponent (including eschatological liar) traditions in the Qumran literature which he regards as providing “valuable material for the understanding of the eschatology of Did. 16.” In these texts, “The underlying conception is that the Sons of Darkness are marshaled and inspired by a particular representative of Belial.”

He further asserts that

89 Jenks 1990: 360.
90 Jenks 2015 (personal communication).
93 Thomas notes Did 16.4 as one of several texts which indicate an early Christian viewpoint that “magic and false prophecy would be Satan’s principal means for persuading human beings to worship him.” (Thomas 2010: 47).
94 Paget 2011: 134.
95 Verheyden 2005: 204.
96 Sorensen 2002: 199n82.
97 “Where Mark and Matthew ascribe their ‘signs and wonders’ to a numerous company of false prophets and sham-Christ, the Didachist ascribes his to a single world-deceiver – just as Paul ascribes his to Satan, for whose name ‘world-deceiver’ is a very natural equivalent.” (Glover 1958: 24)
98 Garrett lists Did 16.4 among several texts “in which associations between false prophets and magic, false prophets and Satan, or Satan and magic are presupposed” (Garrett 1989: 154).
99 Burke cites Draper’s view that the Didache’s antichrist appears to be “an embodiment of a division within the community itself” (Draper 1995b: 284), but this is a sociological reading of the text rather than an interpretation of authorial intent.
100 He states, “Klopf (Die Lehre, p 39) maintains that there is no resemblance between the false prophets in the two sections of Did., since these eschatological false prophets were sent by Satan, but who else could have sent the false prophets of Did. 11!!” (Draper 1983: 308n28)
102 Draper 1983: 308.
the eschatology of Did. 16 rests on the dualism of the Two Ways. God, having created the two spirits in equal measure and set everlasting conflict between them and those who follow them, has allowed the Spirit of Darkness to rule in the present age for a limited time.\textsuperscript{103} Besides this Jewish background, there are a number of early Christian texts which describe Satan as a deceiver (John 8:44; Acts 5:3; 13:10; 2Cor 4:4; 11:14; 2Thess 2:9-11; Rev. 12:9; 20:2-3; 20:10), and several which describe an eschatological Antichrist figure with satanic connections (2Thess. 2:3-10; 1John 4:1-6; Rev. 13:1-4; AscensIs 4).\textsuperscript{104}

Moreover, within Did 16.4, although Satan is not explicitly mentioned and the nature of the world-deceiver is not described, the language used of him has supernatural connotations: He is manifest (\textit{φανερωθεί})\textsuperscript{105} as a son of God, he performs signs and wonders,\textsuperscript{106} the earth is delivered into his hands, and he performs lawless deeds unlike anything done from eternity. These ideas closely parallel the eschatological figure of AscensIs 4, who is explicitly identified as Beliar.\textsuperscript{107}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Note that this would fit well with the suggestion of Jenks and Chester, noted above, that the reason the Didachist omitted angelology from the Two Ways material was to place greater emphasis on the eschatological ending.}
\footnote{The satanic connections in 1John 4 are probably implied by v. 4, where “he that is in the world” is regarded by some scholars as a direct or indirect reference to Satan (Kruse 2000: 91; Minear 1970: 298; Morgan-Wynne 2011: 224-225; Streeft 2011: 235-236; Thatcher 2006: 476). In AscensIs 4, the eschatological Antichrist figure \textit{is} Satan (a.k.a. Beliar). In the case of Matt. 24:24, there is no stated connection between the false prophets and Christs and Satan, but such a connection can be inferred from other passages (Matt. 13:38-43; 25:41).}
\footnote{When used passively with a personal subject, as here, the verb \textit{φαίνω} often has epiphanic connotations (Matt. 1:20; 2:13; 2:19; 24:30; Mark 16:9; Luke 9:8).}
\footnote{On the ‘son of God’ title ascribed to Jesus in Mark 15:39, Smith comments: “The existence of a title implies a conceptual type – in this case, to judge from the usage, a supernatural being in human form who performs miracles by his own divine power. (Accordingly, Christians predicted that the Antichrist, when he appears and claims to be a son of a god – that is, a god – will be a miracle worker, II Thess. 2:3-10; Didache 16.4).” (Smith 1978/2014: 139)}
\footnote{In both Didache 16 and AscensIs 3-4, the scenario opens with an apostasy in the church which includes sheep imagery and a description of love being turned into hatred (Did 16.3-4a; AscensIs 3.21-29). Just as the Didache’s world-deceiver is ‘manifest’ ‘as a son of God’, so the Ascension’s Beliar descends from his firmament in the likeness of a man, speaks like the Beloved (Christ) and declares that he is God (Did 16.4b; AscensIs 4.2, 6). Both the world-deceiver and Beliar perform signs and wonders (Did 16.4c; AscensIs 4.5, 10). Both gain temporary hegemony over the world (Did 16.4d; AscensIs 4.4). Both are described as ‘lawless’ (Did 16.4e; AscensIs 4.2). Both deceive the world (Did 16.4b; AscensIs 4.7). Both cause a further apostasy (Did 16.5b; AscensIs 4.9). In both cases the Lord comes thereafter with his holy ones (Did 16.7-8; AscensIs 4.14). In AscensIs 4.14 the Lord drags Beliar and his hosts into Gehenna (cf. Matt. 25:41), but the fate of the Didache’s world-deceiver is less clear since the ending has been lost. A final parallel of note is the reference in AscensIs 3.21 to the “teaching of the twelve apostles”, which is the very name of the Didache in its prescript (though the wording is not the same in Greek: \textit{τὴν προφητείαν τῶν δώδεκα ἀποστόλων} as opposed to \textit{Διδαχή... τῶν δώδεκα ἀποστόλων}). See Appendix for introductory details on AscensIs.}
\end{footnotes}
Burke offers no real exegetical comments either on Jewish or Christian parallels, or on the language of Did 16.4 itself. The secondary sources cited by Burke either state that the world-deceiver is distinct from Satan (which is consistent with Jenks’ view of a human deceiver with satanic connections), or comment on the text from a sociological perspective.

At least one scholar advocates a position similar to Burke’s (a human world-deceiver with no satanic connection): Milavec, who argues that the Didache does not endorse the idea found in 2Thess. 2:9 that the antichrist figure’s signs and wonders have Satan as their source. He goes on to claim that “The end-times scenario of the Didache deliberately removes any reference to Satan.” In light of the discussion above, however, the majority of scholars who see some sort of satanic connection implicit in Did 16.4 seem to have a stronger case. There is a particularly close parallel between 2Thess. 2:3-10 and Did 16.4. Draper regards this as unquestionably based on a common tradition rather than a direct literary relationship. Since 2Thess. 2 contains a much longer description, it is no surprise that it contains more detail than Did 16.4 about the scenario, including the satanic connections of the Antichrist figure. One can no more assign a theological motive to this silence than to the Didachist’s silence concerning the restrainer (ὁ κατέχων, 2Thess. 2:6).

3.1.5. The Didache’s lost ending

One final issue merits some discussion: the ending of the Didache apocalypse. Most scholars agree that the Didache’s ending in the Bryennios manuscript is incomplete. The fourth-century Apostolic Constitutions contains a paraphrastic rendition of the Didache. Its version of Did 16.8 (where the Didache text breaks off) reads and continues as follows (AposCon 7.32.2f):

Then the world will see the Lord coming upon the clouds of heaven with the angels of His power, in the throne of His kingdom, to condemn the devil, the deceiver of the world, and to render to every one according to his deeds. Then shall the wicked go away into everlasting punishment, but the righteous shall enter eternal life, to inherit those things which eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor have entered into the heart of man, such things as God hath prepared for them that love Him. And they shall rejoice in the kingdom of God, which is in Christ Jesus.

Milavec acknowledges that this longer ending “has been widely accepted as proof for a ‘lost ending’ of the Didache which can or must be accepted as that text which fits into the last seven lines of the Bryennios manuscript.” He himself denies that AposCon preserves the lost ending to any degree and expresses doubt that there ever was a lost ending.

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108 Burke also cites Garrow (2003), who identifies the world-deceiver as a human persecutor and not as the devil, but does not comment on whether the figure has diabolical associations.


110 Draper 1983: 311. Correspondences include the antichrist figure being revealed or manifested (2Thess. 2:8), his usurpation of transcendent or divine titles or prerogatives (2Thess. 2:4), his lawlessness (2Thess. 2:3, 7-9), his performing of signs and wonders (2Thess. 2:9), and his deception (2Thess. 2:10).


112 Following the translation in Aldridge 1999: 5.

At the opposite end of the spectrum from Milavec is Aldridge, who treats the issue of the lost ending in great detail and states concerning AposCon 7, “There is good evidence that this is the Didache’s true ending (approximately).”\(^\text{114}\) His attempt to reconstruct the Didache’s lost ending consists of this passage of AposCon, verbatim.\(^\text{115}\) In similar fashion, Draper states that it seems likely that AposCon has “preserved the ending faithfully.”\(^\text{116}\) Draper quotes a portion of the AposCon passage including the reference to the devil and comments, “This scenario is broadly supported by Asc. Isa. 4:14, 18, which seems to be closely related to Did. 16, and also by Ba. 4:12”.\(^\text{117}\)

More cautious is Niederwimmer. He believes that there certainly was a lost ending, and allows that it might have been similar to what we find in AposCon or the Georgian version of the Didache (the ending of which does not mention the devil), but prudently states, “I shall not be bold enough to attempt to reconstitute the lost conclusion of the Didache by conjecture.”\(^\text{118}\) Verheyden, likewise, rejects the idea that AposCon reproduces the lost ending of the Didache exactly but does regard AposCon as “a kind of paraphrase” of it.\(^\text{119}\) In similar fashion, Van de Sandt and Flusser write concerning AposCon’s rendition of the Didache in general, “On account of the frequent paraphrases, citations from both testaments in the bible and interpretations, the text reads more like a commentary.”\(^\text{120}\)

It is also to be noted that Burke misrepresents one of his sources here. Commenting on Jefford’s work, he says,

Jefford notes that the Epistle of Barnabas (which shared a Two Ways source with the Didache), did not contain an apocalypse at all, making any suggestion that the Didache had a lost apocalyptic conclusion ‘mere speculation’.\(^\text{121}\)

This statement gives the impression that Jefford regards it as merely speculative whether the Didache had a lost apocalyptic conclusion. However, this is not Jefford’s point. What he calls “mere speculation” are arguments about whether any of the materials in Did 16 can be attributed to the Two Ways source. At issue here are “the background texts that were incorporated into the chapter”,\(^\text{122}\) and not whether the ending was lost – an issue he does not even address here!

Garrow argues in light of the portrayal of the world-deceiver as a human persecutor in Didache 16.4-5 that “the original ending described the judgment of the world-deceiver (cf. 16.4b) and not of the world-deceiving devil”.\(^\text{123}\) Peerbolte too regards διάβολος in AposCon 7.32 as reflecting the redactor’s

\(^{114}\) Aldridge 1999: 5.
\(^{115}\) Aldridge 1999: 12-13.
\(^{116}\) Draper 1983: 326.
\(^{117}\) Draper 1983: 326.
\(^{118}\) Niederwimmer 1998: 227.
\(^{119}\) Verheyden 2005: 207.
\(^{120}\) van de Sandt & Flusser 2002: 27. Concerning the Georgian version of the Didache and AposCon, they state, “It is hard to decide...to what extent these versions – even in combination – may be helpful to reconstruct in detail the ending of the Didache” (2002: 36-37).
\(^{121}\) Burke 2015: 10.
\(^{122}\) Jefford 1989: 89.
\(^{123}\) Garrow 2003: 56-57.
understanding of the world-deceiver and thus presumably not as part of the Didache’s original ending.\textsuperscript{124}

Within the context of Did 16.4, if the author were to identify the world-deceiver as the devil, it seems more likely that he would do so the first time he mentioned this figure rather than the second. Accordingly, we can classify it as improbable (but not impossible) that the original ending to the Didache explicitly identified the world-deceiver as the devil.

In his own analysis, Burke goes far beyond the evidence to make claims about the devious motives of the redactors who produced AposCon 7.32. He states that they modified the text to agree with fourth-century beliefs in supernatural evil, and that

The fact that this term (διάβολος) was added deliberately indicates the compilers of the Apostolic Constitutions felt the Didache had not identified the world deceiver as satan, evidence that the Didache’s demythologized character was recognized by later Christians.

Rather than being a deliberate distortion of the Didache’s apocalyptic ideas, it is more likely that AposCon preserves a traditional interpretation of the world-deceiver in Did 16.4, as referring to the devil. Moreover, as we have seen above, the link between the eschatological opponent and Satan is not a fourth-century idea but a first-century one.\textsuperscript{125}

In summary, the evidence for identifying the world-deceiver of Did 16.4 as Satan himself is not persuasive. A fairly strong case can be made that the world-deceiver is a human being with supernatural, that is to say satanic, empowerment – even if this is only implicit in the text. This view has considerable scholarly support, although Milavec rejects it outright. If it surprises us that the Didachist would leave such an important implicit connection unexplored, we ought to be reminded of Niederwimmer’s point (quoted above) that the Didache only notes theological motifs in passing, without systematic reflection.

### 3.2. Epistle of Barnabas

Burke states that the Epistle of Barnabas “presents clear evidence of strong mythological belief”.\textsuperscript{126} Commenting on the reference to ὁ σατανᾶς in Barn 18.1, he says that here the term “is used explicitly of a supernatural evil referent accompanied by his own angels and presented as God’s opponent”.\textsuperscript{127} One can agree with this assessment, but a few further exegetical comments are in order.

\textsuperscript{124} Peerbolte 1996: 181.
\textsuperscript{125} In addition to 2Thess. 2:9 and Rev. 13:1-4 likely being first-century documents, AscenIs 4 probably dates from the early second century or possibly late first century (see Appendix).
\textsuperscript{126} Burke 2015: 13.
\textsuperscript{127} One would want to know whether Burke would accept accompaniment by his own angels and opposition to God (or God’s angels) as proof that ὁ σατανᾶς or ὁ διάβολος explicitly denotes a supernatural evil referent in texts such as Matt. 25:41 and Rev. 12:7-9.
Burke follows Holmes\textsuperscript{128} in interpreting Barn 19.11 as a reference to ‘the evil one’. However, the term τὸ πονηρόν is neuter and so clearly refers to abstract evil. Ehrman rightly translates, “Completely hate what is evil”.\textsuperscript{129}

Burke also misses one reference to ὁ μέλας (‘the black one’) in Barn 4.10. While this is clearly a reference to Satan, it is less clear that τὸ μελανός ὁδός in 20.1 refers to Satan. One could translate ‘the way of the black one’ or ‘the way of darkness’ here. The latter would arguably form a more obvious contrast with ‘the way of light’ (ὁδός τοῦ φωτός) in Barn 19.1, 12, but scholars tend to read this as a reference to ‘the black one’, probably in view of 4.10.\textsuperscript{130} In view of the likely Alexandrian provenance of this document, Byron suggests that the author may have been influenced by “either the real or imaginative ‘presence’ of Ethiopians and Blacks in Alexandria and used ho melas as a trope within the ethno-political rhetoric about vices and sins.”\textsuperscript{131} This appears to be pure speculation, since Byron admits that the author nowhere uses melas in an ethnic sense, so Peerbolte is more likely correct that “The use of melas for Satan originates in its use as a synonym of ponēros.”\textsuperscript{132} Within Barnabas, as we have seen, μέλας contrasts not with whiteness but with light.\textsuperscript{133}

The masculine ὁ πονηρός seems obviously to refer to a personal being in Barn 2.11 (cf. 4.13). Byron suggests that ὁ πονηρός here “could refer to the devil, or more specifically to the Roman emperor Trajan.”\textsuperscript{134} In support of this assertion, he notes that Trajan is referred to as the ‘evil one’ in the Jerusalem Talmud, Sukkah 5.1, 55B: “In the time of Trogianos, the evil one (טָרוֹגיָנּוֹס הרָשַׁע), a son was born to him on the ninth of Av...”\textsuperscript{135} In fact, not only Trajan but also Titus is referred to in Jewish literature as ‘the evil one’ (the latter for entering the Holy of Holies). However, two observations reduce the significance of this parallel with the satanic designation ὁ πονηρός. In the first place, when applied to Trajan or Titus, ‘the evil one’ accompanies the emperor’s personal name: it is ‘Trajan the evil one’ or ‘Titus the evil one’, and not a stand-alone designation. Secondly, הרשע need not even function as a substantive in these texts; one could also translate it as an attribute adjective: ‘the evil Titus’ or ‘Trajan the Wicked’.\textsuperscript{136} In view of this, it is extremely unlikely that the substantive ὁ πονηρός in Barnabas or any other early Christian text refers to the Roman emperor. It is rather a designation for Satan.

It is syntactically possible that the gender-ambiguous τὸ πονηρῷ in Barn 21.3 means ‘the evil one’ par excellence (Satan), ‘the evil one’ generically, or ‘evil’ abstractly. Here, again, a satanic referent is more

\textsuperscript{128} Holmes 2007: 437.
\textsuperscript{129} Ehrman 2003b: 79.
\textsuperscript{131} Byron 2002: 65.
\textsuperscript{132} Peerbolte 1996: 191.
\textsuperscript{133} So Arndt et al (2000: 626) more generally, states that μέλας is “the color of evil, forming a contrast to the world of light.”
\textsuperscript{134} Byron 2002: 64.
\textsuperscript{135} Byron 2002: 155n68. He is dependent on Modrzejewski 1997: 209. See also, e.g. Neusner 1988: 118; Saldarini 1975: 68; Goldberg 1970: 164.
likely in view of the earlier usage. Ambiguity is also present in Barn 15.5, where τὸν καιρὸν τοῦ ἀνόμου could refer to ‘the lawless one’ generically or ‘the lawless one’ par excellence (Satan). The latter is preferable because the phrase that immediately follows (κρινὴ τοὺς ἁσεβεῖς) refers to generic wicked humans in the plural.

Burke states, “This satan is the primary explanatory recourse for Barnabas’ hamartiology (4:9), theodicy (2:1), martyrlogy, and eschatology (15:5)”. While Barnabas “located the struggle between the two ways or two kingdoms at the center of his teaching,” his hamartiology has a clear anthropological dimension. Indeed, Russell regards Barnabas’ view of temptation as related to “the rabbinic doctrine of the two yetserim”, a connection which Burke seems to take in other texts as evidence for a non-mythological worldview. While evil clearly has a mythological dimension for Barnabas, the struggle against evil is fought by ethical means (19:1-12; 21:4-8). This shows that an anthropological and ethical hamartiology is consistent with a mythological worldview and does not, on its own, constitute evidence for a non-mythological worldview.

A further comment is needed on Barnabas’ demonology. Burke states that “neither demons or exorcism are mentioned” in Barnabas. This is incorrect: demons are mentioned in Barn 16.7, where the ‘house’ imagery might suggest the notion of possession. The ‘evil angel’ (ἄγγελος πονηρός) of Barn 9.4 may not technically be a demon (depending on how carefully Barnabas distinguished such ‘species’), but still witnesses to a belief in supernatural evil beings other than Satan himself (like Barn 18.1).

3.3. 1 Clement
Burke asserts that “1 Clement uses no satanological terminology.” In this statement he challenges the scholarly consensus concerning 1Clem 51.1, which he dismisses in just a couple of sentences by claiming that “there is no precedent” for the word ἀντίκειμαι being used with reference to Satan.

The relevant text reads as follows:

And so we should ask to be forgiven for all the errors we have committed and the deeds we have performed through any of the machinations of the Enemy ("Ὅσα οὖν παρεπέσαμεν καὶ ἐποίησαμεν διὰ τινος τῶν τοῦ ἀντικειμένου, ἄξιωσώμεν ἀφεθήναι ἥμιν καὶ ἐκεῖνοι δέ").

τοῦ ἀντικειμένου is a substantivized participle which carries the article. ‘The adversary’ or ‘the enemy’ would thus be appropriate translations. Since the context does not identify this adversary, one must ask, who is the adversary par excellence who might have caused Christians to sin? The obvious answer is Satan, whose function as tempter or seducer of people is prominent in the NT. This is true regardless of whether there is precedent for this particular word being used with reference for Satan.

In fact, however, the claim that there is no precedent is dubious. In Zech. 3:1 LXX, the verb θύρω is translated into Greek as ἀντίκεισθαι, while the noun θύρω is translated into Greek as ὁ διάβολος. This LXX text seems to have been the impetus for Justin Martyr’s use of ἀντικειμένος for Satan. In Job 1:6 THEO, θύρω is translated ἀντικειμένος. In 2Thess 2:4, ὁ ἀντικειμένος is used of the eschatological Antichrist figure, who in this text is a human being (v. 3) with satanic associations (v. 9). The term may be used of Satan in 1Tim. 5:14, although this is disputed. The extant Latin version of Ps-Philo’s LAB

149 Ehrman 2003a: 127.
150 Burke (2015: 14) states that ἀντικειμένος is a ‘verb’ which means ‘adversary’. He characteristically neglects to note the presence of the article.
152 This infinitive is preceded by a genitive article which, however, does not denote definiteness but purpose (cf. Wallace 1996: 590-591, 610).
153 Hence Bartelink regards this text as an important background to the use of ἀντικειμένος as a Satanological term in the early church. He states, “Kommt ἀντικείμενος als Bezeichnung für Satan in der LXX nicht vor, so ist mit diesem Text doch eine Verbindung zwischen διάβολος und ἀντικείσθαι gegeben” (1987: 208).
154 Justin uses the participle ἀντικειμένος twice to modify διάβολος (Dial. 116.3, 8). In the second instance the morphology is identical to 1Clem 51.1: τοῦ ἀντικειμένου. English translations have tended to translate these participles verbally (“opposing/oppose us”, “opposed him”, Williams 1930: 239-240; Falls 1948: 327), but Bobichon’s recent French translation takes them as substantives (“le diable nous menace, éternel adversaire”; “le diable, son adversaire”, Bobichon 2003a: 495, 497). In this passage Justin is clearly adapting the language of Zech. 3:1 LXX (Bartelink 1987: 208n6), a text he also quotes on two other occasions (Dial. 79.4; 155.2). This demonstrates that the association of ὁ διάβολος with the verb ἀντικειμαι in Zech. 3:1 LXX could inspire early Christian writers to adapt the latter into a Satanological designation. Justin may also have used ὁ ἀντικειμένος as a stand-alone designation for Satan in Fragm. de resurr. 1 (so Bartelink 1987: 211), although the attribution of this text to Justin is disputed (see e.g. Allert 2002: 32; Bynum 2013: 28-29; Daley 1991: 230n1; Jurgens 1970: 63; Whealey 2006).
156 Marshall 2004: 605 states that the majority of scholars interpret the adversary here as a human opponent of the gospel (see a list of such scholars in Burke 2015: 14-15n87). However, Marshall cites nine scholars who regard it as a reference to Satan, to which we can add Marshall himself, Bartelink 1987: 209; Bobichon 2003b: 864n8;
45.6 uses the word *anteciminus* which “has been taken over from the Greek ἀντικείμενος” and “almost certainly” reflects יְשֵׁי in the Hebrew original,\textsuperscript{157} the date of which is disputed.\textsuperscript{158} As will be argued below, ὁ ἀντικείμενος is used as a designation for Satan in MartPol 17.1. ‘The adversary’ in Ascens 11.19, which in context clearly refers to Satan, may reflect ὁ ἀντικείμενος in the lost Greek original (this passage survives only in Ethiopic).\textsuperscript{159} This portion of the text is generally dated to the late first century AD.\textsuperscript{160} Other uses of the term for Satan dating probably from the second century are found in Ptolemy the Gnostic’s *Letter to Flora* 7.5, Clement of Alexandria, *Paed.* 1.8, *Strom.* 2.5, 4.18, 21.1,\textsuperscript{161} and in Eusebian quotations from the Martyrium of Lyon\textsuperscript{162} and an anonymous opponent of Montanism (*EcclHist* 5.1.5; 5.1.23; 5.1.42; 5.16.7). Origen (*Cels* 6.44) states that ἀντικείμενος is the Greek translation of the Hebrew name Σατάν or Σατανᾶς.\textsuperscript{163}

Hence, Zech. 3:1 LXX is the only relevant text which can said with certainty to be a precedent for the use of ἀντικείμα for Satan.\textsuperscript{164} However, other texts – especially 1Tim. 5:14, LAB 45.6 and Ascens 11.19 – represent possible precedents and at least roughly contemporaneous parallels to 1Clement’s use of ἀντικείμενος for Satan. More broadly, it is clear that ὁ ἀντικείμενος was well-established as a designation for Satan by the mid to late second century. It would hardly be anomalous for the author of 1Clement to have so used the term here.

Further along we will see some literary-historical evidence that this author’s theology has been influenced by the lost Book of Eldad and Modad, a source which likely contained teachings about the devil and one which certainly influenced the Shepherd of Hermas, who clearly has a mythological Satanology.


\textsuperscript{158} “The date of the document, however, is highly debated. Most agree that it was written sometime between 135 BCE and 135 CE, though disputes usually centre on whether it is a pre-70 CE or post-70 CE work.” (Sprinkle 2012: 85-86)

\textsuperscript{159} The likelihood that the original Greek had ἀντικείμενος here is enhanced by the fact that elsewhere in the document, Satan has apparently been transliterated rather than translated (2.2, 2.7, 7.9, assuming the Greek Legend of Isaiah preserves the Greek text of Ascens faithfully (cf. Charles 1900: 141-148); and seemingly also, 5.16; 11.23; 11.41; 11.43). This implies that the Greek had a word other than σατανᾶς and meaning ‘adversary’ in 11.19. Based on other usage of the period, ἀντικείμενος would be the most likely candidate, though ἀντίδικος is also possible (cf. 1Pet 5:8). Other possible uses of ἀντικείμενος for Satan in fairly early works that do not survive in Greek are ApAb 24.5; 2En 70.6; Vita 33.3.

\textsuperscript{160} See Appendix on dating.

\textsuperscript{161} *Strom.* 4.18 is actually a paraphrase of 1Clem 51.1 (Bartelink 1987: 210n11) and thus witnesses to an early Satanological interpretation of this text. *Strom.* 2.5 and 21.1 are paraphrases of Mt. 4:8-10 and Lk 4:5-7 respectively (Bartelink 1987: 215), which suggests the interchangeability of ἀντικείμενος and διάβολος as Satanological designations.

\textsuperscript{162} For more detail on the Satanology of this text, see under MartPol 17.1.

\textsuperscript{163} Acknowledging that Zech. 3:1 LXX does not refer to the devil in the later Christian sense, but does refer to a supernatural being in a text which surely influenced the development of the Christian concept of Satan (cf. Jude 9; Justin Dial. 79.4; 115.2).
Hence, we follow the overwhelming consensus of scholars in considering 1Clem 51.1, contra Burke, to be a reference to Satan.\(^{165}\)

It remains to discuss 1Clem 3.4, which quotes from WisSol 2.24 (a text which uses the word διάβολος) but does not mention διάβολος in the quotation. Burke comments that Clement, like James, here “attributes sin to the lusts of the evil heart.”\(^{166}\) However, Burke’s main point here is that Clement has (correctly) interpreted διάβολος in WisSol 2.24 as referring to Cain, in contrast to later patristic writers who interpret the text as referring to the devil. Some understood it to refer to the events in the Garden of Eden, but others understood it to refer to Cain’s murder of Abel. 1John 3:12 (cf. 8:44), which (like Theophilus in the late second century)\(^{167}\) explicitly links Cain to the activity of the devil, may be an early witness to this interpretation.

The view that the anarthrous διαβόλος in WisSol 2.24 refers to the devil has lately fallen out of favour among scholars.\(^{168}\) Zurawski interprets this διαβόλος as a generic adversary, while several others interpret it to be Cain (cf. WisSol 10.3).\(^{169}\) Based on the discussion of Cain in 1Clem 4.1-7, it seems clear that the author of 1Clement understood WisSol 2.24 to allude to Cain’s murder of Abel. Accordingly, most scholars conclude that he interpreted this διαβόλος to be Cain and not the devil.\(^{170}\)

There are, then, basically three possibilities for what has happened here. (1) διαβόλος in WisSol 2.24 referred to the devil, but 1Clement (wrongly) interpreted it as a reference to Cain. (2) διαβόλος in WisSol 2.24 referred to the devil, and 1Clement interpreted it accordingly, but does not quote this part of the verse, choosing to focus on Cain as the one through whom the devil’s envy was manifested. (3) διαβόλος in WisSol 2.24 referred to Cain (or a generic adversary), and 1Clement interpreted it as a reference to Cain.

Dochhorn seems to prefer (1) while remaining open to (2).\(^{171}\) If (2) is correct, 1Clement may have omitted the part of the quotation referring to the devil because his immediate concern was on human

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\(^{166}\) In light of our exegesis of 1Clem 51.1 we might add that Clement, like James, also gives Satan a role in this process (cf. Jas 4:7).

\(^{167}\) Theophilus, Ad Autolycus 2.29.

\(^{168}\) Zurawski 2012; Kelly 2006: 78-79; Clifford 2013: 21; Levison 2015: 51-52. Recent proponents of the traditional ‘devil’ interpretation include Dochhorn (2007a: 150-151) and Knibb (2007: 700); NRSV.


\(^{170}\) This view of 1Clement is taken in Clifford 2013: 21, Kelly 2006: 78-79, and Byron 2011: 223. Dochhorn 2007a: 152-154, 158-159 agrees that Cain has taken centre stage in 1Clement’s exegesis of WisSol 2.24 but does not say the writer has applied the word διαβόλος in his source directly to Cain.

\(^{171}\) Dochhorn notes that 1Clement neglects to attribute to the devil a role in the origin of death in the world. He contrasts this with Theophilus, Ad. Autol. 11.29-34, who undoubtedly does so. Nevertheless, Dochhorn refrains from claiming that the devil’s involvement is absent in 1Clement’s exegesis; he describes the devil’s role as
envy and its consequences, not cosmology. If (1) is correct, 1Clement may have omitted the part of the quotation referring to a διάβολος because in his own setting the word had taken on a technical meaning (‘devil’) which, in his view, did not apply in WisSol 2.24.

However, the soundest option may be (3). In this case, 1Clement has certainly not demythologized the devil because there was no devil in the text to demythologize. The most that can be said is that, unlike later Christian writers, he refrained from mythologizing the text.

However we explain the writer’s use of WisSol 2.24 in 1Clem 3.4, there are no grounds for claiming that he avoided referring to the devil because of theological reservations with this concept. Dochhorn specifically cautions against assuming that 1Clem 3.4 represents a demythologization of WisSol 2.24, as had been asserted by Beyschlag. Lona considers it noteworthy that 1Clement does not mention the devil in this passage, but his explanation for the omission centres on the pastoral context in Corinth and not on whether the author’s worldview was mythological.

Paul’s letters to the Roman and Corinthian churches (the source and recipient of 1Clement, respectively) show that a Satan concept did exist in their theology in the mid-first century, and the Shepherd of Hermas shows that a Satan concept existed in Rome in the mid-second century. How likely is it that, as Burke’s title puts it, ‘the devil left’ for a few decades in between? Very unlikely indeed, especially in light of 1Clem 51.1.

Nevertheless, it is apparent that Satan plays only a minor role in the theology of 1Clement. Knoch suggests that this is because Satan has been disempowered in the writer’s eschatological outlook.

3.4. Shepherd of Hermas

Burke gives a good summary of the introductory issues surrounding the Shepherd of Hermas. This work is considered a composite unity written and redacted over a lengthy period by a single author. Based on the likelihood that Visions 1-4 were written first, and (in contrast to other parts of the work) contain no
references to Satan, evil spirits or demons, Burke suggests that Hermas’ worldview changed over time. Specifically, in the time period between the writing of Visions 1-4 and the rest of the work, Hermas adopted mythological views (“accepting a belief in a supernatural evil tempter, the devil”) as well as other mythological terminology, which he demythologized (“rejecting a belief in literal demons and applying demonological language to human vices”).

We will first address the issue of Hermas’ Satanology and then return to the more complex subject of his demonology. First, we must correct some inaccuracies in Burke’s description. He states that “Satanological language is found frequently in Vision 5 and Mandates”, in fact there is no Satanological language in Vision 5.

He further states that Satanological language in the Similitudes (Parables) is limited to “one use of diabolos”. This analysis is superficial and inadequate. In the first place, there is scholarly support for the ruler or master of ‘this city’ in the first Similitude being an allegorical reference to the devil. While the reference to the ‘laws’ of ‘this city’ may appear more suited to a political ‘lord’ (the Roman emperor) than a cosmic ‘lord’ (Satan), HermSim 12.4.5-6 contrasts the Lord’s commandments with ‘the commandments of the devil’, just as this allegory contrasts the laws of the two cities. Moreover, since ‘leave this city and go to your own’ (HermSim 1.6) appears to refer to martyrdom, the intention of the lord of this city to ‘banish you for not adhering to his law’ carries cosmic rather than merely political connotations.

Moreover, in addition to one use of διάβολος (HermSim 8.3.6), there is a second reference to “the most wicked devil” (nequissimo diabolo) in a portion of the text extant only in Latin.

Concerning the absence of mythological language from the Visions compared to the Mandates and Similitudes, this trend is not limited to Satan and demons but extends to the spirit world in general. Moser observes that forms of ἅγγελος occur 9 times in the Visions compared with 20 in the Mandates and 47 in the Similitudes. Similarly, the Shepherd uses forms of πνεῦμα 9 times in the Visions compared with 58 in the Mandates and 39 in the Similitudes. Specifically, the ‘holy spirit’ is mentioned ten times in the Mandates and nine times in the Similitudes but this expression never occurs in the

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179 Burke 2015: 24.
180 Burke 2015: 17.
181 Burke 2015: 17.
182 This view has the support of Gokey (1961: 131, 174n100), Van Oort 1991: 309, and two German scholars, Dibelius and Brox, cited by Osiek (1999: 158n8, 159n18). Against this view are Koscheski (2011), who identifies the lord of the earthly city as Rome, and Osiek 1999: 158-159. She regards this passage as a sustained metaphor or allegory, and initially suggests that the referent of the lord of the city is between “the Roman emperor or the devil”, but subsequently suggests that this point in the story “is more parable than allegory, so that a strict correspondence of every character need not be found.” She thinks Hermas’ optimism about the presence of God’s spirit in the world precludes the implication “that the devil controls the world.” Nevertheless, as she sees the issue of martyrdom behind this passage and the reference to the devil in HermSim 8.3.6 (Osiek 1999: 204), her argument is not convincing at this point.
183 This clause is not present in all manuscripts but is retained by Ehrman (2003b: 365) and Holmes (2007: 604).
184 HermSim 9.31.2
185 Moser 2005: 37n40.
Visions.\textsuperscript{186} If one is going to argue from silence that Hermas had no belief in Satan or demons at the time he composed the Visions, one might as well argue that Hermas had no belief in the Holy Spirit.

One certainly detects no antagonism toward belief in the spirit world (good or evil) in the Visions. There is thus no reason to suppose that the absence of Satan and demons from the Visions and their presence in later portions of the work indicates a fundamental theological shift. Possibly, the writer matured theologically to the point where he was comfortable writing about the spirit world (we will see below in Ignatius' epistles that this was not considered an elementary subject). Or possibly, his rhetorical or homiletic purposes at the time of writing the Visions did not call for such language. Giet had used theological diversity within the Shepherd to argue for multiple authorship.\textsuperscript{187} In response, Joly expressed his doubt that the different sections reflect different theological outlooks. He remarked specifically on Satan, “Le mot διάβολος n’apparaît que dans les Préceptes. C’est peut-être qu’Hermas ne parle pas, ne sent pas le besoin de parler du diable ailleurs.”\textsuperscript{188} Osiek similarly remarks on “The thematic unity of the book in spite of some divergences”.\textsuperscript{189} Burke’s hypothesis of a radical shift over time in Hermas’ view of the spirit world appears to have no scholarly support. In light of Hermas’ apparent demythologization of demons (which we will examine shortly), Burke finds Hermas’ use of διάβολος “as an apparent reference to a supernatural evil tempter”, “anomalous”.\textsuperscript{190} He thinks “a case could be made” that Hermas also demythologizes the devil, but does not attempt to argue this case. Instead, he adopts “a simpler and more cautious approach,” namely, “to conclude that Hermas views the diabolos as an independent being”.

One can commend Burke on overcoming his biases at this point. However, this approach is not really very simple. Originally Hermas denied the existence of Satan and demons, then he came to apply demonological language to human vices while still “rejecting a belief in literal demons”, while at the same time “accepting a belief in a supernatural evil tempter, the devil”. Is this incoherent picture really the simplest approach? Perhaps the ‘anomaly’ arises only because Burke has misinterpreted Hermas’ demonology.

One could wish to know what case Burke thinks could be made for a demythologized devil in Hermas, since the issue is really quite clear-cut.

In the first place, as both Gokey and Boyd have observed,\textsuperscript{191} in contrast to demons and spirits, Hermas never calls any of the personified vices διάβολος. From this, Boyd concludes that “the traditional role of Satan basically stands unaltered”;\textsuperscript{192} that is, Satan is “mythologically portrayed as an external agent of

\textsuperscript{186} The only non-human use of πνεῦμα in the Visions is a formula referring to ‘a spirit’ (anarthrous) which takes the narrator to a visionary experience (HermVis 1.1.3; 2.1.1).
\textsuperscript{187} Giet (1963).
\textsuperscript{188} Joly 1967: 214.
\textsuperscript{189} Osiek 1999: 10.
\textsuperscript{190} Burke 2015: 22.
\textsuperscript{191} Gokey 1961: 126; Boyd 1975: 51, 161.
\textsuperscript{192} Boyd 1975: 51.
evil". Gokey similarly concludes that Hermas’ beliefs about Satan are orthodox, that is, in line with Roman Catholic theology.

The numerous references to the devil in the Mandates make it clear that a personal, supernatural being is in view. In HermMan 4.3.4-6 he is said to tempt people by devising “intricate plots” (πολυπλοκίαν), language that is reminiscent of 1Clem 51.1 and 2Clem 18.2. In HermMan 5.1.3 his character is contrasted with the Lord’s. In HermMan 7.2-3 and 12.6.1-4 he is not to be feared because he has no power in contrast to the Lord. Only his works are to be feared. These three passages all demonstrate the modified cosmic dualism typical of the NT literature. In HermMan 11.1-3, a false prophet can speak some true words because “the devil fills him with his own spirit, to see if he can dash one of the upright.” In HermMan 12.5.4 he “comes against all the slaves of God to put them to the test” and is able to enter and dominate those who are partly empty. The ruler of the city in the first Similitude, if he symbolizes the devil, can hardly be a demythologized devil.

Of special tradition-historical interest are the references to the devil in HermMan 12.4.7-12.5.2, which contain a striking parallel with Jas. 4:7:

The devil can cause only fear, but his fear has no force. And so do not fear him, and he will flee from you... If then you resist him, once he is conquered he will flee from you in humiliation.

Seitz holds that this and other close parallels between the Shepherd, James 4:5-9a, and Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, suggest that all three depend on some unknown ‘scriptural’ source. He further suggests that this is the same source quoted (pertaining to double-mindedness) in 1Clem 23.3-4 and 2Clem 11.2-4. A plausible conjecture is that this source is none other than the lost Book of Eldad and Modat cited in HermVis 2.3.4. We thus have some grounds for claiming that the Satanology of James, Hermas, and the authors of the two Clementine works were influenced by a common source. Thus, the more comprehensive data in Hermas sheds light on the Satanology of these other three writers.

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195 e.g. Matt 13:36-43; John 8:44; Acts 26:18; 2Cor 6:15; Jas. 4:7; 1John 3:10; 4:4; Rev 12:7-9.
196 As noted above, a similar idea is found in Justin, Dial 82.2-3.
197 Ehrman 2003b: 301.
198 E.g. TDan 5.1; TNaph 8.4.
200 Allison (2011) argues at length that the apocryphon of Eldad and Modad is the source behind 1Clem 23.3-4, 2Clem 11.2-4, and Jas 4:5. Hagner (1973) and Donfried (1974) are sympathetic to this view of the source of 1Clem 23.3-4 and 2Clem 11.2-4, while Bauckham (2010) regards Eldad and Modad as the probable source of all three. Even if we do not accept this work as the source for 1Clem 23.3-4, the fact that HermVis 2.3.4 quotes from this book (probably around the end of the first century) shows that it was known at that time in the Roman church, which renders it very likely that Clement of Rome was familiar with the book.
201 Allison’s (2011: 131) conclusion is that the lost book of Eldad and Modad “appears to have significantly influenced at least four Christian texts”. He means James, Hermas, 1Clement and 2Clement. Elsewhere (2013: 23) he notes that, like Seitz, he is convinced that the influence of Eldad and Modad on both James and Hermas “accounts for many or most of the striking similarities between James and Mandate 12”. Among these striking similarities, of course, is the parallel mentioned above about the devil fleeing when he is resisted.
We can take our conclusion to Hermas’ Satanology from Osiek:

The last verses of chapter 4 through the end of Mandate 12 frequently discuss the efforts of the devil against the forces of good. The language and thought world behind it presuppose an agonistic spirit world in which invisible forces of good and evil are engaged in a war, whose battleground extends into human hearts and motivations. The language bears similarities to that of magical divination, in which potentially malevolent spirits are subjugated, and made to serve human purposes. At the same time, these passages give a good review of traditional Jewish and Christian moral teaching about the devil. The argument here is that of appearance contrary to fact: the commandments of God seem difficult, but are really easy (v. 5); those of the devil are the really difficult ones (v. 6), with negative adjectives heaped up to describe them.202

The famous ‘two angels’ motif in HermMan 6.2 will help us segue into our discussion of Hermas’ demonology. Hermas states, “A person has two angels, one of righteousness and the other of wickedness” (HermMan 6.2.1), which respectively produce virtues and vices. Boyd203 and Gokey204 think that the angel of wickedness is the devil himself, while Russell thinks it is either the devil or a manifestation of him.205 Notably, in HermMan 5.1.3, the devil is irascible (ὀξυχόλος) while the Holy Spirit is sensitive (τρυφερός). The same adjectives are used of the two respective angels in HermMan 6.2.3-4. However, in HermMan 5.1, the devil contrasts with the Lord whereas the Holy Spirit contrasts with “another, evil spirit”. This parallel suggests that the “angel of righteousness” is the Holy Spirit, while the “angel of wickedness” is an evil spirit from the devil, and not immediately the devil himself.

Burke rightly observes Hermas’ “repeated emphasis on an internalized dualism of the human heart,”206 of which the two angels passage is a prime example. One can agree with Burke and his sources that these angels correspond to the good and evil inclination of rabbinic thought, and represent a more internalized form of the Two Ways dualism found in 1QS and Barnabas. The same point is emphasized by Gokey.207 He notes, “We are now face to face with the role of the devil in the psychology of sin.”208 Nevertheless, there is no contradiction between texts that stress the internality of the conflict and those that stress its externality. Osiek states:

Two-way paraenetic theology has roots in both Greek and Jewish moral traditions. It externalizes the same idea that the teaching on the two kinds of indwelling spirits internalizes. While the question of different sources must be examined, it is not a question of different concepts or worldviews; all arise from an anthropological dualism that ascribes the experience of good and evil to external causality.209

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203 Boyd 1975: 33.
204 Gokey 1961: 133n8.
205 Russell 1987: 43.
206 Burke 2015: 19.
207 Gokey 1961: 121-123.
208 Cf. HermMan 9.9-11 and 12.2.2, where certain vices are called the devil’s daughters.
209 Osiek 1999: 123.
She goes on to say, “These verses contain the heart of Hermas’ teaching on discernment of spirits.”

The most striking feature of the Shepherd’s demonology is the identification of specific vices with evil spirits or demons. (According to Bucur, ‘angel’ and ‘spirit’ are interchangeable terms in The Shepherd). Once again we have an internalization of dualistic forces. The difficult exegetical question is whether the two angels and the demon- or spirit-vides are impersonal forces or personal beings who still retain a separate existence. That is, has Hermas (1) demythologized demons by identifying them with vices, or has he (2) mythologized vices by identifying them with demons? Burke notes scholars’ uncertainty concerning this question. For his part, Gokey thinks that “The personal and evil character of the word δαιμόνιον is very clear from its Jewish usage” whereas “There is some ambiguity in the case of πνεύμα”. Perhaps the answer is a little bit of both: by conflating demons with vices, their mythological character is less pronounced but not eliminated.

Burke, however, argues emphatically for (1):

Hermas has not attributed human passions and vices to demonic possession, he has used the language of demonism to characterize human passions and vices, which nonetheless remain non-supernatural evil impulses.

In support of this, he states that Russell “characterizes the dualism of Hermas as ethical rather than cosmological”. This false dichotomy runs throughout Burke’s work, beginning from his taxonomic framework. Ethical and cosmological dualism are compatible rather than contradictory; and Russell does not say Hermas’ dualism is ethical rather than cosmological.

Burke’s other argument for (1) is that “Hermas never describes exorcism as the means of dealing with these ‘spirits’” but instead prescribes “repentance, faith, and moral self-renewal.” For him, this “non-supernatural remedy which is applied to the individual” demonstrates “that he is not thinking of a cosmological struggle between the individual and external supernatural force, which can only be remedied by recourse to a third party exercising supernatural power (such as exorcism)”. Burke has again failed to appreciate Hermas’ integration of external and internal forces; and his rule that external supernatural forces can only be dealt with using supernatural power such as exorcism is his own, not that of Hermas (or the early church).

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211 Bucur 2007: 122. Osiek (1999: 32) similarly states concerning the Two Ways tradition, “The distinction between spirits and angels in this context is a fine one, if it exists at all.”
212 Gokey 1961: 126.
213 Burke 2015: 21.
214 Burke 2015: 20.
215 Burke’s attempt to strictly dichotomize between ‘supernatural’ and ‘non-supernatural’ remedies even has him making an antithesis between ‘moral’ and ‘spiritual’ (2015: 22). Moreover, neither ‘faith’ nor prayer (cf. HermVis 1.1.9) are ‘non-supernatural’ since they entail the invocation of a deity’s help. Burke also appears to ignore that Hermas’ teachings come to him in visionary experiences mediated by supernatural beings. All of this strongly suggests a role for the supernatural in the process of repentance and salvation.
216 Burke 2015: 21.
The insufficiency of this argument can also be seen by comparison to Barnabas 18-21, and throughout the Ignatian epistles (on which see below). There, too, the prescribed method of dealing with evil is ethical, with no mention of exorcism; yet Burke acknowledges that supernatural opponents are in view in these documents.

Burke’s alleged parallel to rabbinic commentary is also dubious. He himself claims that what happens in rabbinical literature (a continuing belief in demons but no supernatural tempter) is the exact reverse of what happens in Hermas (a continuing belief in a supernatural tempter but no belief in demons), and thus hardly a parallel at all. In any case, his interpretation of rabbinic literature stands unsubstantiated.  

Interpreting Hermas’ demon-voices as strictly impersonal seems intuitive to the 21st century English speaker, since this is the way the word ‘demon’ is predominantly used in vernacular today (e.g., speaking of an alcoholic as struggling with ‘his demons’). However, we should be wary about anachronistically importing such notions back into the Sitz im Leben of Hermas, in which belief in the spirit world was real. As Osiek states, “The world of Hermas is inhabited by many spirits, both good and evil... by hosts of intermediary spirits, as was common in popular Greco-Roman and Jewish cosmology of the time.” While acknowledging that certain characters in Hermas may have originally been intended allegorically, she warns, “To try to distinguish sharply between allegorical figures, spirits, and angels is to do violence to the elusive nature of the imagery.”

Osiek comments on HermMan 5.1.2,

Verse 2 is central to the teaching on the discernment of spirits: to be under the control of an evil spirit does not have to mean the dramatic signs of demon possession, for it can happen in everyday affairs. Yet the language is forceful: the evil spirit tries to push its way in (παρεμπολλέλει) if it can.

This runs counter to Burke’s assertion that the Apostolic Fathers never refer to demons or demon possession.

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217 Burke cites Rosen-Zvi (2011) to the effect that Belial and Mastema, although prevalent in Second Temple literature, are absent from the rabbinic corpus. However, this does not prove Burke’s point that the rabbis know of no supernatural tempter; in fact they do: Satan. This is even acknowledged by Rosen-Zvi, who, however, regards “Satanic incitements to sin (in the manner of Mark 1:13, Luke 22:3, 1 Cor 7:5, and the like)” as “extremely rare in rabbinic literature”, but not absent: he finds this idea in b. Ber. 62b; Git. 52a; Kid. 81a-b; Bab. Bat. 15b-16a; San. 89b; 107a (2011: 161n56). He elsewhere describes Reish Lakish’s Satan as a “demonic being” (2011: 80) and comments on some other texts, “The narratives differ only on the driving force of temptation: in the first case it is the yetzer, while in the other two, Satan. This, however, does not make any significant difference in the narratives, for both equally function as tempters” (2011: 113). See Reeg (2013) for a more detailed discussion of Satan’s nature and tempting role in rabbinic literature.

218 Osiek 1999: 31, 33.

219 Osiek 1999: 34. This is similar to Russell’s observation, noted by Burke, that the differentiation between literal and figurative in Hermas is not always distinct. Yet Burke still insists that Hermas’ demonology is exclusively figurative.

220 Osiek 1999: 120. Note also her comment on HermMan 11.3: “The wordplay on emptiness is consonant with the spatial language used elsewhere about spirit possession, especially 5.1.3, 2.5” (1999: 142).
In summary, while Burke can be commended for recognizing the mythological character of the devil in the Shepherd of Hermas, one cannot endorse his conclusions about the purely allegorical nature of the demons, spirits and angels in the Mandates, or about Hermas’ alleged paradigm shift with respect to supernatural evil over the course of his composition of the whole work. His exegesis leads to internal inconsistency in Hermas’ thought whereby he has demythologized the at least the evil side of the spirit world but left the devil be. In fact, Hermas’ projects social struggles “into the cosmic realm, where divine and demonic power battle for control of human beings.” This motif incorporates both the struggle between good and evil spirits and that between God and the devil.

3.5. Polycarp’s Epistle to the Philippians

After a brief discussion of introductory issues, Burke notes the reference to diabolos and satanas in PolPhil 7.1, but characteristically neglects to note the presence of the article in the Greek. Burke asserts, however, that “the letter provides little evidence for what Polycarp understood ‘the devil’ and ‘satan’ to mean”.

Based on the fact that Polycarp makes no other recourse to the language of supernatural evil, but does describe issues such as hamartiology and martyrlogy in non-mythological terms, Burke argues from silence that Polycarp’s letter is “predominantly non-mythological” and “at the most...weakly mythological”. The logic of this argument from silence is unconvincing. The key to determining the extent to which Polycarp’s view of evil was mythological is not to focus on passages where such language is absent, but on passages where such language is present. Barnabas’ Satanology is known, not from the lengthy discourse between 4.13 and 15.5 which does not mention Satan or demons, but from those texts which do use such language. Ignatius’ Satanology is known, not from the letter to Polycarp which makes no reference to Satan, but from the other six extant letters which do. Similarly, if we want to know about Polycarp’s view of Satan we ought to study the text in which he mentions Satan!

Burke’s apparently agnostic stance on what Polycarp meant by ‘the devil’ and ‘satan’ is puzzling since he shows exegetical effort to uncover the meaning of these terms. While it is true that the letter itself provides no explanation of these terms, this in itself suggests that he did not use the terms in any innovative way but expected his readers to apply to them a generally accepted Christian meaning. It only remains to ask whether it is possible to reconstruct that meaning with any confidence.

The passage in which these terms occur is a threefold denunciation of heresy:

For anyone who does not confess that Jesus Christ has come in the flesh is an antichrist; and whoever does not confess the witness of the cross is from the devil (ἐκ τοῦ διαβόλου ἐστίν); and whoever distorts the words of the Lord for his own passions, saying that there is neither

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221 Osiek 1999: 126.
222 Osiek 1999: 126.
223 Burke 2015: 24.
resurrection nor judgment – this one is the firstborn of Satan (οὗτος πρωτότοκος ἐστι τοῦ σατανᾶ). (PolPhil 7.1)

The synonymous parallelism implies that ‘the devil’ and ‘Satan’ are equivalent terms (the same cannot be said for ‘antichrist’ due to the difference in case and definiteness).

The obvious parallel in 1John 4:2-3 (cf. 2John 7) to the first part of the parallelism makes it “almost certain” that Polycarp is under “influence from the Johannine epistles”, although some scholars have theorized that Polycarp and the Johannine epistles draw on “a common anti-gnostic ecclesiastical tradition.” While the Johannine literature does not use the expression “firstborn of Satan”, it does use the expression “of the devil” (ἐκ τοῦ διαβόλου, John 8:44; cf. ἐκ τοῦ πονηροῦ, 1John 3:12) and uses paternal/filial imagery for the devil’s relationship with evil humans (John 8:44; 1John 3:10). Hence, John’s Satanology provides a useful proxy from which to reconstruct Polycarp’s Satanology. The validity of this approach is reinforced by the form of PolPhil 7.1, which appears to be a well-established confessional, even liturgical, formula.

The Satanology of the Johannine literature is generally agreed to reflect cosmic dualism akin to that found in numerous Qumran texts. Moreover, the view of Gnosticism presupposed in PolPhil 7.1 is arguably similar to the view of heresy expressed in Rev. 2:24. Again, PolPhil 6.3 (the verse prior to 7.1) uses the term ἀποπλανῶσι for the activities of false teachers; Dochhorn notes that this word has a “satanologische Konnotation” (cf. Rev. 12:9; 20:2). The evidence before us suggests that Polycarp shared the same mythological worldview as these writers.

A further proxy for Polycarp’s Satanology is found in Ignatius of Antioch. It appears from both this letter and from Ignatius’ letter to Polycarp that the two men were well acquainted and held each other in high regard (IgnPoly 1.1, 2.3, 7.2-3; PolPhil 1.1; 9.1). Ignatius entrusts Polycarp with the task of writing letters on his behalf to churches to which he did not have a chance to write (IgnPoly 8.1), while Polycarp

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226 Harrison 1936: 173 thinks that PolPhil 7.1 quotes or adapts 1John 4:2 and conflates it with 2John 7.
228 Hartog 2013: 127; Gokey 1961: 92n2. Hartog (2002: 102) argues that since ‘firstborn of Satan’ is parallel to ‘antichrist’ and ‘of the devil’ which are both “traditional epithets”, therefore ‘firstborn of Satan’ must also be “a common label.”
231 The similarity is noted by Fiorenza (1973: 569n25), who interprets Rev. 2:24 to mean that “the probable claim of the Nicolaitans to know the deep mysteries of God is according to [the author of Revelation] knowledge not of divine but of demonic realities.”
233 “Polycarp worked with Ignatius, compiling and preserving his letters, and Ignatius’ letter to Polycarp reflects their friendship and mutual respect” (Gray 2010: 528). Commenting on these texts from IgnPoly, Schoedel writes, “Ignatius knows Polycarp’s ‘godly purpose’ – Polycarp’s firm guidance of the church in Smyrna and his support of Ignatius in this connection” (1985: 258). He further notes, “Polycarp’s unquestioned worthiness in this connection may be taken as a reflection of the superiority that Ignatius attributes to the churches who support him (see on IgnEph 11.2-12.1)” (1985: 279n10). Hence, what seems to be implicit here is that Polycarp was a loyal supporter of Ignatius.
says he has forwarded letters of Ignatius to the Philippians who “will be able to profit greatly from them, for they deal with faith and endurance and all edification that is suitable in our Lord” (PolPhil 13.2). Inasmuch as “Ignatius plays the role of a mentor” toward Polycarp, it is quite plausible that he has influenced Polycarp theologically. One can therefore to some extent justify interpreting ὁ διάβολος and ὁ σατανᾶς in PolPhil 7.1 through the lenses of the Ignatian letters (which, as we shall see, witness to a mythological Satanology, as Burke acknowledges).

Yet another proxy is available in the clearly mythological view of Satan in the Martyrdom of Polycarp (2.4(3.1); 17.1; see below for exegesis). This document claims to have been written by the church at Smyrna (MartPol prescript), of which Polycarp had been bishop (IgnPoly prescript; MartPol 16.2) until his late martyrdom. It is reasonable to assume that the document would reflect the view of Satan which the bishop himself had taught in Smyrna.

Again, Irenaeus of Lyons claimed to have been mentored by Polycarp (Adv.Haer. 3.3.4). Irenaeus clearly had a well-developed Satanology, and he refers to Polycarp having used the expression “firstborn of Satan” for Marcion (Adv.Haer. 3.3.4). Papias, who was a companion of Polycarp according to Irenaeus (Adv.Haer. 5.33.4), also believed in a fall of angels, and although his writings are lost for the most part, there is some evidence (albeit of disputed authenticity) that he believed in Satan as well (see below).

Thus, both those likely to have influenced Polycarp and those likely to have been influenced by Polycarp reflect a mythological view of Satan. This gives further support to a mythological reading of the Satanological language in PolPhil 7.1.

A final observation is in order with respect to the expression “firstborn of Satan.” Dahl argues that PolPhil 7.1 and John 8.44 both depend on a Jewish tradition which held that Cain was the offspring of a union between Satan and Eve (cf. 1John 3.8). This tradition may lie ultimately behind the phraseology, but both John and Polycarp apply the term to contemporary opponents, who are Satan’s children through spiritual, and not physical, heredity (1John 4.4). Filial imagery for those under Satan’s control is known from other early Christian traditions as well (Matt. 13:38; Acts 13:10).

In summary, there is no need to plead ignorance regarding Polycarp’s Satanology. Instead, there is good evidence that he stood firmly within the early Christian tradition which attributed heresy to the infiltration of the church by a mythological Satan figure.

### 3.6. Martyrdom of Polycarp

This text is the earliest extant example of the martyr-acts genre. Although Burke’s source states that the majority of scholars favour a late second century date, Ehrman states that “probably the majority of

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234 House 2010: 381.
235 “Polycarp…mentored Irenaeus” (Gray 2010: 528), and “Irenaeus regarded Polycarp as the most important living link between Christ and himself” (Grant 2006: 36).
238 Middleton 2011: 6; Rhee 2005: 40.
scholars” favour a date in the mid-150s, although some date it as late as 177. Burke’s introductory discussion focuses mainly on text-critical issues, and rightly notes that the epilogue in chapters 21-22 does not belong to the original text. Burke begins his discussion of the Satanology of this work with a characteristic argument from silence: the writer neglects to mention the devil in his reference to the final judgment in 11.2, “where reference to ‘the eternal fire that has been prepared for the devil and his angels’ (Matthew 25:41 NET) might at least be expected”. Burke does not offer evidence for the writer’s use of Matthew’s Gospel elsewhere, but in any case it is simply flawed methodology to anticipate what a writer ought to have said in a particular passage if he believed in the devil.

One can agree with Burke in ignoring the reference to Satan that occurs in the epilogue (23.2). Accordingly, our focus is on two passages which use Satanological language, namely 2.4 (or 3.1) and 17.1. Both passages use this language as explanatory recourse for Christian martyrdom.

Burke comments on the overall poor nature of the textual tradition, which he claims is “particularly the case in 2.4 and 17.1.” Burke then makes an even bolder claim concerning these two passages:

> Although these recognized textual inconsistencies, interpolations, and ambiguities do not suggest that either ὁ πονέρος or διαβόλος have no place in the text, they do indicate that these passages have been subjected to modifications intended to alter the intended meaning of these terms by changing their referents.

While it is in principle possible that the textual variants that exist represent deliberate attempts to change the meaning of these texts, and while it is even in principle possible that such changes were theologically motivated, Burke gives no evidence for this in the present case. In any case, our concern is not with the views of later scribes, but those of the author of the Martyrdom. With this in mind, the

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240 This is less certain in the case of chapter 21 than 22 (see Hartog 2013: 328ff), but chapter 21 has no bearing on our discussion.
242 See discussion of intertextuality in Hartog 2013: 209-211. Some scholars have posited dependence on Matthew, but there are no clear quotations.
243 Note that the clause which mentions ὁ διαβόλος falls within 2.4 in Holmes’ text but commences 3.1 in Ehrman’s (2003a: 371). We will follow Holmes’ versification here for ease of comparison with Burke’s commentary.
244 Burke presents no evidence, primary or secondary, that these two passages are particularly problematic from a textual point of view.
246 Commenting on NT textual criticism, Fee (1993: 194-195) remarks, “Although most corruption to the NT text was probably ‘deliberate,’ it was seldom theologically motivated in the sense of trying to score a theological point; furthermore, although deliberate, it was not malicious in the sense of trying to alter the meaning of the text (in fact ‘deliberate,’ as a way to distinguish such variation from inadvertent error, does not even need to mean ‘thoughtful’ or ‘purposeful’). Rather, such changes were ordinarily made in the interest of readability or completeness of the text, that is, in the interest of clarifying its meaning. For the early Christians, it was precisely because the meaning was so important that they exercised a certain amount of freedom in making that meaning clear.”
important observation is that the manuscripts unanimously includes Satanological terminology in both of these two passages. Thus Burke’s guarded statement that the textual problems “do not suggest that either ho ponēros or diabolos have no place in the text” is far too weak. In fact, we can state with complete confidence that ὁ διάβολος and ὁ…πονηρός do have a place in the text, due to the unanimity of the manuscript evidence.

Coming to 2.4, Burke takes note of a textual problem in 2.4, the verse immediately prior. This reads, in Holmes’ translation (quoted by Burke),

4 And in a similar manner those who were condemned to the wild beasts endured terrible punishments: they were forced to lie on sharp shells and afflicted with various other forms of torture in order that he might, if possible, by means of the unceasing punishment compel them to deny their faith; for the devil tried many things against them.

The bolded pronoun ‘he’ does not appear in the Greek; the subject is implied by the verb. However, in all but one manuscript, a subject is explicitly supplied: ὁ τύραννος (the tyrant). Burke argues for the retention of this noun, which would (in his view) make a human tyrant the subject of at least this part of the statement. His text-critical argument rests on two points:

(1) Externally, ὁ τύραννος is the “majority reading” found in all but one manuscript
(2) Internally, “It is more likely that a copyist would consider ho turannos to cause an unnecessary confusion of the subject by rendering the identity of ho diabolos ambiguous, and wish to remove it in order to ensure the presence of the devil is made explicit.”

With regard to the first point, it is a well-established principle of textual criticism that quality of manuscript evidence trumps quantity. The fact that the two latest critical texts of the Martyrdom omit ὁ τύραννος suggests that these experts consider the Moscow manuscript to be superior in this part of the text. As to the internal argument, another well-established principle of textual criticism is that the more difficult reading is to be preferred. However, while the presence of ὁ τύραννος and ὁ διάβολος in proximity might cause confusion, the passage reads much more awkwardly if no subject is implied: an unknown subject seeks to compel the Christians to deny their faith, and we must read on to find out that it is the devil. It seems more probable that the author forgot to supply a subject (perhaps thinking the subject had already been mentioned) and a copyist later smoothed out this difficulty by supplying a subject.

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247 Burke 2015: 32.
248 “The single most important principle of modern textual criticism is that manuscripts must be weighed not counted. This means that it is the quality of the manuscripts not their quantity that is decisive in text critical decisions” (Wettlaufer 2013: 18).
250 Such confusion or ambiguity, however, is unlikely to have concerned the referent of ὁ διάβολος, an established Christian technical term.
251 Holmes 2007: 309 regards the devil as the implied subject of the clause, “in order that he might, if possible, by means of the unceasing punishment compel them to deny their faith”.

While Burke thinks (following Lieu) that it is unlikely that a copyist would add ὁ τύραννος because it is uncommon in Christian martyrologies, he goes on to note that the term is common in 4Maccabees, which has influenced MartPol considerably. However, a copyist who was familiar with 4Maccabees might have made such an addition.

In the end, the matter is uncertain, but there is insufficient evidence to say that the text “indicates” a theologically motivated manipulation of the text. Burke follows his text-critical argument by stating what, for him, are its exegetical implications:

With the reading ho turannos, the diabolos in 2.4 then becomes a term for the earthly persecutor, the Roman proconsul mentioned in the very next passage (3.1). Further evidence for this is the fact that diabolos is used in 1 Maccabees 1:36 of the opponents of the Jews under Apollonius. This text is also significant for its use of ho ponēros (‘the evil one’), the term which appears in Matyrdom [sic] of Polycarp 17.1.252

The first statement is simply an assumption on Burke’s part. One of Burke’s main sources here is Lieu, who thinks that ὁ τύραννος “perhaps should be preserved.” However, what Burke fails to notice is that Lieu thinks that ὁ τύραννος, if authentic, would refer to the devil.253

A second possibility (if ὁ τύραννος is authentic) is that it refers to a human persecutor whose torments are then given a theological interpretation: the devil was actually behind the persecution.254 Indeed, this reading is supported by the observation that the statement, “For the devil devised many torments against them”255 is basically redundant unless the subject has changed: the narrative has just described the various kinds of torments inflicted by the tyrant on the Christians. It is further supported by the Martyrrium of Lyon quoted by Eusebius (discussed in more detail below), in which we find the statement,

When the tyrant’s tortures (τῶν τυραννικῶν κολαστηρίων) had been overcome by Christ through the perseverance of the blessed saints, the Devil thought up other devices: imprisonment in filth and darkness, stretching feet in stocks to the fifth hole, and other atrocities that angry jailers, full of the Devil, inflict on prisoners.256

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252 Burke 2015: 33.
253 “The Martyrdom of Polycarp brings us to another ominous theme: the ultimate source of all this opposition is not the proconsul nor the mob nor even the Jews, although we shall return to them, but the devil. Already at the beginning of the account the colourful variety of tortures endured by the earlier martyrs was recognized as the devices of the devil trying by many means to subvert them to denial (Mart.Poly. 2.4.3-1). At that point he appears merely as ‘the devil’, And possibly as ‘the tyrant’ (ὁ τύραννος) which is read in 2.4 by the majority of Greek MSS (except M).” (Lieu 2002: 145; the words after “the devil,” continue the thought in n29).
254 So Hartog 2013: 230: “In Mart. Pol’s perspective, the devil himself lies in the shadows behind the persecution (2.4-3.1). This view, that the devil (or demons) incited persecution, was not uncommon in the period.” He cites Justin, I Apol. 5; 57; 63; Justin, 2 Apol. 8; Justin, Dial. 18.39; 131.2; cf. also AscensIs 11.41.
255 MartPol 3.1a (Ehrman 2003a: 371)
This text uses the language of tyranny alongside mention of the devil’s role. In this text, the devil is clearly distinguished from his human agents who are ‘full of’ him. Hence, if, contra Ehrman and Holmes, we retain ὁ τύραννος, this in no way removes a supernatural devil from the text.

Besides this, the two supporting arguments supplied by Burke are both fundamentally flawed. In the first place, διάβολος in 1Macc 1.36 does not refer to the opponents of the Jews. It refers to a place: the citadel. Moreover, Burke as usual neglects to assign any significance to the fact that διάβολος in 1Macc 1.36 is anarthrous whereas in MartPol 2.4(3.1) we have ὁ διάβολος. Secondly, Burke’s statement that “This text is also significant for its use of ho ponēros (‘the evil one’)” is simply false: ὁ πονηρός does not occur in 1Macc 1.36, though the (very common) adjective πονηρός does occur, modifying διάβολος attributively. It can be noted here that MartPol’s broader dependence on Maccabean literature in no way rules out a mythological dimension having been added to the martyrology. The martyrology of Ignatius – which Burke acknowledges has a cosmic, Satanological dimension – is also thought to have been shaped by 4Maccabees.

With the alleged Maccabean background to MartPol’s Satanological language seen to be unpersuasive, it would be more sensible to look for the source of the martyrrological significance of this language in early Christian texts. In addition to the texts cited by Hartog, the devil is implicated in persecution of Christians in texts which almost certainly predate MartPol (1Pet. 5:8; Rev. 2:10; IgnMag 1.2; IgnRom 5.3; 7.1?). Hence, “the notion of the devil acting through a human agent” would be no innovation by this writer, never mind later copyists of this text with a malicious theological agenda. Note especially the strong similarity between MartPol 2.4 and IgnRom 5.3, both of which describe various types of torture including wild beasts and bodily mutilation before attributing these torments to the devil. This parallel is surely significant in view of Ignatius’ own martyrdom and the relationship between Ignatius and Polycarp noted above.

The view that ὁ διάβολος refers to the devil and not a human opponent in 2.4(3.1) seemingly enjoys unanimity among scholars.

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257 So NETS (Zervos 2007: 481): “It[a] became an ambush for the holy precinct and an evil enemy to Israel continuously.” Footnote a reads, “I.e. the citadel,” and NRSV: “for the citadel became an ambush against the sanctuary, an evil adversary of Israel at all times” (here a footnote tells us that ‘the citadel’ is simply ‘it’ in the Greek).

258 Hence the translations ‘an evil enemy’ and ‘an evil adversary’ above.

259 IV Maccabees represents an effort to proclaim the fate of the Maccabean martyrs as an example of the supremacy of Reason in a style calculated to appeal to the Greek mind. It seems likely that the importance of the Maccabean martyrs to the Jews of Antioch – the martyrs were said to be buried in Antioch, and a famous synagogue had been erected in their honor – had determined the shape of aspects of Ignatius’ thought and style.” (Schoedel 1993b: 312)

260 See n254 above.

261 This martyrrological explanatory recourse may derive ultimately from the contention in Jesus traditions that the devil was responsible for the crucifixion (Luke 22:3, 53; John 13:2, 27; cf. 1Cor 2:8).

262 Setzer 2009: 113. She is referring to MartPol 17.1.

We now turn to the second passage in MartPol containing satanological terminology: 17.1.

After quoting Holmes’ translation of 17.1-2, Burke comments extensively on the awkwardness of the passage, follows Gibson in noting the instability of the textual tradition here (with two manuscripts completely omitting 17.2d-3), and cites Gibson’s opinion that it is unclear who or what the ‘evil one’ is in this passage. Ehrman’s translation of 17.1 reads as follows:

But the jealous and envious Evil One (Ὁ δὲ ἀντίζηλος καὶ βάσκανος πονηρός), the enemy of the race of the upright (ὁ ἀντικείμενος τῷ γένει τῶν δικαίων), having seen the greatness of Polycarp’s death as a martyr and the irreproachable way of life that he had from the beginning – and that he had received the crown of immortality and was awarded with the incontestable prize – made certain that his poor body was not taken away by us, even though many were desiring to do so and to have a share in [Or: to commune with; or: to have fellowship with] his holy flesh.264

The following two verses elaborate how the Jews instigate the magistrate not to hand over Polycarp’s body lest the Christians begin to worship him, and explain that Christians worship the Son of God and not martyrs.

We can note at this stage that while there has been considerable debate over the integrity of the Martyrdom, recent scholars have tended to argue that the book is “a unified whole, written at one time by one author” with the exception of the epilogue of chapter 22 and possibly 21.265 Schoedel notes that “although serious doubts have been entertained about the integrity of MartPol, critical opinion is now moving in the opposite direction”.266 Von Campenhausen, the main challenger of the integrity of the Martyrdom, argued for a number of interpolations in MartPol, including the material from 17.2-18.267 Some scholars have regarded 17.2-3 in particular as an interpolation since it “fits badly with the syntax of the surrounding material”268 and because 17.2d-3 is missing in two manuscripts (as noted above). Dehandschutter argues for the integrity of chapters 17-18, accepting only the name of Alce in 17.2 as an interpolation.269 Setzer regards 17.2 as “probably interpolated.”270 Schoedel argues broadly for the integrity of the document but brackets a number of passages as secondary, including 17.2-3.271 He holds that the text reads quite naturally if 17.2-3 are removed. Gibson notes that the Jews would then appear abruptly in 18.1.272 However, this abruptness in the original text may explain why a later editor felt the need to provide a back story.

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269 Dehandschutter 1993: 497.
272 Gibson 2003: 156.
A common element in the scholarly discourse is that there is much debate over the integrity of chapter 17, *beginning from v. 2*; especially vv. 2-3. However, the fact that nearly all challenges to the text’s integrity commence the interpolation within v. 2 *indicates that the authenticity of v. 1 is accepted.*

There are, however, several textual variants in 17.1a, where the Satanological language is found. Where Eusebius and five Greek manuscripts read ἀντίζηλος, Parisinus reads ἀντίδικος (cf. 1Pet 5.8) and Mosquensis reads ἀντικείμενος. Two Greek manuscripts (Chalcensis and Vindobonensis) add δαίμων after πονηρός. However, the fact that the critical texts of Holmes and Ehrman agree perfectly in this clause apart from the καὶ prior to πονηρός (retained by Holmes but omitted by Ehrman) suggests we can have some confidence in the original wording.

Gokey notes four possibilities for translating the first clause.275 (1) ἀντίζηλος and βάσκανος could be attributive adjectives modifying the substantive ὁ...πονηρός: “the jealous and envious evil one...” (2) πονηρός and βάσκανος could be attributive adjectives modifying the substantive ὁ ἀντίζηλος: “the jealous one, envious and evil...” (3) All three terms could be predicative adjectives: “the jealous and envious and evil...” (4) All three could be substantives: “the jealous one and envious one and evil one...” Five Greek manuscripts, including Mosquensis, add καὶ before πονηρός, but it is not retained by Ehrman. In the absence of this καὶ, the first option is clearly correct, in which case ὁ...πονηρός is a designation for Satan. If καὶ is present, it is less clear whether the three terms are adjectival or substantival.

In any case, the presence of the article, together with the emphatic, multifaceted designation, indicates that the individual referred to is the jealous, envious and evil one *par excellence*; the enemy of Christians *par excellence*. ‘Evil one’ is a relatively common designation for Satan in early Christian texts.276 By contrast, the terms ἀντίζηλος and βάσκανος do not occur in the NT. Βάσκανος “often occurs as a modifier of δαίμων on sepulchral inscriptions... and has common associations with magic.”277 Bartelink suggests that “the same terms that were earlier applied to demons [by pagans] could be taken over without any difference and be applied to evil spirits which were known to Christendom”.278

On the background to ὁ ἀντικείμενος, see above on 1Clem 51.1. However, one further significant parallel should be noted here: the *Martyrium of Lyon*. This text is quoted at length in Eusebius’ *Ecclesiastical History* 5.1. It purports to be an encyclical letter from Gaul and is “generally dated 177”279 and thus temporally near to MartPol (see above for parallel to MartPol 2.4-3.1). Goodine & Mitchell

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276 Cf. Matt 5.37; 6.13; 13.38; 13.39; John 17.15; Eph. 6.16; 2Thess 3.3; 1John 2.13; 2.14; 3.12; 5.18; 5.19; Did 8.2; Barn 2.10; 21.3.
278 Bartelink 1952: 80-81.
note that “scholars have overwhelmingly viewed it as authentic.”

Dehandschutter states, “Some correspondences [in the Martyrium] with MPol are uncontroversially explained as the influence of the latter on the former.”

Significantly, the Martyrium refers to the instigator of the Gallic martyrdom three times as ὁ ἀντικείμενος (5.1.5; 5.1.23; 5.1.42), and also as τοῦ πονηροῦ (5.1.6), τοῦ διαβόλου (5.1.25; 5.1.27 [twice; anarthrous in the second instance]), διαβολικοῦ (5.1.35), τοῦ σατανᾶ (5.1.14; 5.1.16), and, possibly, ἀγρίου θηροῦ (5.1.57). The way these terms are used leaves no doubt as to their supernatural referent. The ferocity of ὁ ἀντικείμενος gives the Christians a foretaste of his imminent advent, doubtless a reference to the eschatological trial or antichrist event. Human persecutors are the “followers” of ὁ ἀντικείμενος. The Christians’ unbelieving servants make false accusations against them because they are “ensnared by Satan.” ὁ ἀντικείμενος had been vanquished by the sufferings of Christ.

Within MartPol 17.1, a further indication that ὁ ἀντικείμενος is a supernatural figure is...

...having seen the greatness of Polycarp’s death as a martyr and the irreproachable way of life that he had from the beginning – and that he had received the crown of immortality and was awarded with the incontestable prize...

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280 Goodine & Mitchell 2005: 1-2n1. They note two scholars who have questioned its authenticity.
282 This is noted by Bartelink 1987: 212.
284 Here following the critical text of Lake (1926).
285 This reference to incitement of the pagan persecutors by “wild beast” has been understood by some to be a reference to Satan (Maier 1999: 177, Grant 2006: 5, Stouck 1999: 17, who make this identification explicit; Roberts & Donaldson 1886/2007: 783, Schaff 1890/2007: 217, Frilingos 2013: 99, who capitalize ‘Beast’ and so clearly take it to mean more than a natural animal). Typical of these is Grant: “Incited by a wild beast [the Devil] wild and barbarous tribes could hardly stop”. However, others appear to understand the phrase with reference to a natural animal (Musurillo 1972 in Kraemer 2004: 355, Weidmann 2000: 410, Kannengiesser 1986: 48, Ehrman 1999: 40). Typical of this interpretation is Kannengiesser’s translation: “because a wild and barbarous people once inflamed by a wild beast are not easily held in check”. Given the absence of the article, this writer is inclined to follow the latter sense.
286 See the summary in Goodine & Mitchell 2005: 11n25, who describe the terminology for Satan used in the text, regarding it as reflecting a dualism similar to that in the Gospel of John and in Revelation.
287 “For the Adversary (ὁ ἀντικείμενος), in a foretaste of his own imminent advent (παρουσίαν αὐτοῦ), attacked us with all his might” (EcclHist 5.1.5, trans. Maier 1999: 171). Παρουσία is the word used frequently in the NT to refer to Christ’s second advent (Matt. 24:3, 27, 37, 39; 1Cor. 15:23; 1Thess. 2:19; 3:13; 4:15; 5:23; 2Thess. 2:1; 2:8; Jas 5:7-8; 2Pet. 1:16; 3:4; 1Jn 2:28). The word is used of an antichrist figure in 2Thess. 2:9.
290 EcclHist 5.1.23.
This portion of text, which contains no textual variants, states that ὁ ἀντικείμενος had seen Polycarp’s way of life from the beginning, which consisted of 86 years in Christ’s service (MartPol 9.3). It further states that ὁ ἀντικείμενος had seen that Polycarp had received immortality. Obviously neither of these statements could be made concerning the Roman proconsul but only of a transcendent being. Buschmann argues that Martyrdom of Polycarp reflects a dualism with affinities to the Two Ways or Two Angels teaching.  

Hence, despite uncertainties surrounding the integrity and text of MartPol 17.2-3, we can conclude contra Gibson that the referent of MartPol 17.1a is not unclear, and contra Burke that the referent is not the Roman proconsul. The referent is Satan, as most scholars agree, and Burke’s attempt to argue otherwise only demonstrates the flaws in his exegetical method.

3.7. Fragments of Papias

Burke’s cursory treatment of the fragments of Papias is disappointing both in its lack of attention to detail and the surprisingly strong claims that he makes. He first states that only two of the fragments (which he numbers 11 and 24, following Holmes) “contain any satanological or demonological terminology.” However he rejects the authenticity of this content on the basis of his view of the content of Papias’ book (“simply a collection of oral sayings by Jesus”, 293) and his observation that no such content is preserved in other surviving fragments of Papias. In view of how little of Papias’ work survives, it is remarkable that Burke could draw conclusions about what was likely or unlikely to be present in the work. Moreover, Bauckham surveys considerable scholarly debate on whether Papias’ book simply contained oral traditions about Jesus or whether it also interpreted them. Bauckham concludes that the contents were probably closer to Gospel traditions than interpretations thereof. However, importantly for our purposes, he also concludes based on four extant fragments that are related to Genesis 1-3 that “Papias began his work with an account of the primeval history”, which he reinterpreted christologically. This leaves open the possibility that his primeval history described the fall of Satan and his angels, which these two fragments (possibly) describe.

Fragment 11, quoted by Andrew of Caesarea in his commentary on Revelation, reads as follows in Holmes’ translation:

But Papias says, word for word: ‘Some of them’ – obviously meaning those angels that once were holy – ‘he assigned to rule over the orderly arrangement of the earth, and commissioned them to rule well.’ And next he says: ‘But as it turned out, their administration came to nothing.


293 Burke 2015: 36.

294 Bauckham 2014: 474.
And the great dragon, the ancient serpent, who is called the Devil and Satan, was cast out; the deceiver of the whole world was cast down to the earth along with his angels.  

This fragment is one of those whose authenticity is beyond dispute. If Andrew of Caesarea has interpreted Papias correctly, his work made reference to bad angels. Papias may have proceeded to link this comment to a quotation of Rev. 12:9. However, Shanks argues that Holmes has misattributed the length of the fragment. Observing that the context of the fragment is Andrew’s exegesis of Rev. 12:7-8, he points out that a quotation of Rev. 12:9 would be a logical transition to the next portion of Andrew’s commentary. Hence, the quotation of Rev. 12:9 is probably Andrew’s and not Papias’. Ehrman, too, ends the fragment before the quotation of Rev. 12:9. Nevertheless, Shanks still thinks the fragment comes from “a text in Papias’s writings regarding Satan’s fall.” Bauckham apparently includes Rev. 12:9 in the fragment from Papias and describes it as a “statement about the fallen angels, with allusion to ‘the ancient serpent’.” He regards it as part of the primeval prologue with which he believes Papias began his work.

Based on the statement about the angelic failure in the part of the fragment that is generally accepted, the possibility that Papias himself quoted Rev. 12:9 in this regard, and the way in which Andrew of Caesarea used Papias’ material (as illuminating the reference to the dragon and his angels in Rev. 12:7), there is a strong likelihood that Papias’ work offered a mythological interpretation of primeval evil. One cannot say confidently that the extant fragment refers to Satan, but given that this fragment occurs in a context which discusses supernatural evil beings, one should not discount the possibility that Satan was mentioned in this part of Papias’ work.

The second fragment (24) is translated in Holmes as follows:

And Papias spoke in the following manner in his treatises: ‘Heaven did not endure his earthly intentions, because it is impossible for light to communicate with darkness. He fell to earth, here to live; and when humankind came here, where he was, he led them astray into many evils. But Michael and his legions, who are guardians of the world, were helping humankind, as Daniel learned; they gave laws and made the prophets wise. And all this was war against the dragon, who was setting stumbling blocks for men. Then their battle extended into heaven, to Christ himself. Yet Christ came; and the law, which was impossible for anyone else, he fulfilled in his body, according to the apostle. He defeated sin and condemned Satan, and through his death he spread abroad his righteousness over all. As this occurred, the victory of Michael and his legions, the guardians of humankind, became complete, and the dragon could resist no more, because the death of Christ exposed him to ridicule and threw him to the earth. Concerning which Christ said, ‘I saw Satan fallen from heaven like a lightning bolt.’ In this sense the teacher understood

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295 Holmes 2007: 749.
296 Dehandschutter 1988: 405.
297 Schoedel summarizes the fragment’s meaning: “Wicked angels misrule nature” (Schoedel 1993a: 239).
298 Shanks 2013: 229-230.
299 Ehrman 2003b: 111.
300 Shanks 2013: 230.
301 Bauckham 2014: 474.
not his first fall, but the second, which was through the cross, and this did not consist of a spatial fall, as at first, but rather of judgment and expectation of a mighty punishment... 302

The authenticity of this second fragment is questionable; 303 it is preserved only in an Armenian version of Andrew’s commentary. Ehrman simply notes that he does not include the Arabic or Armenian fragments and refers the reader to Kürzinger’s work without comment. 304 Those who defend the authenticity of this fragment include Siegert (who published the Armenian fragments), 305 Kürzinger, 306 Holmes (apparently, since he includes it in his text), Shanks, 307 and, most comprehensively, Lourié. 308 Schoedel seems cautiously optimistic, noting only a “possibility” that it does not come from Papias. 309 Those who argue against it include Körtner 310 (whose arguments Dehandschutter accepts 311) and, more recently, Norelli 312 (the latter says that it is not impossible that the fragments derive from Papias, but not probable either). Bauckham finds Norelli’s arguments “compelling”, 313 whereas Lourié finds them “very scanty.” 314 While one of the main arguments against the authenticity of the fragment is that it is absent from the Greek version of Andrew’s commentary, Lourié counters (following Siegert) that one phrase from the quotation does appear in the Greek version (where, however, it is not attributed to Papias). He also points out that all five Armenian manuscripts of Andrew’s work “are identical in the part relevant to our Papias quote”. 315

We can cautiously proceed, bearing in mind the uncertainty regarding the attribution of the fragment to Papias. Once again, we face the problem of where the quotation breaks off. While Holmes, Siegert, Kürzinger and Shanks end the Papias fragment with the quotation of Luke 10:18, 316 Lourié breaks it off earlier, after “made the prophets wise.” 317 Schoedel notes “some question about the length of the quotation” but does not offer an opinion. 318 If Lourié is correct then Papias’ fragment provides far less detail about Satan than if the quotation extends to the citation of Luke 10:18. However, given its context in Andrew’s work, the subject of the beginning of the quotation can still be none other than Satan.

302 Holmes 2007: 763.
304 Ehrman 2003b: 89.
305 Siegert 1981.
306 Kürzinger 1983.
307 Shanks (2013: 249) writes that although he does not think the manuscript preserving this fragment should be attributed to Andrew of Caesarea, nevertheless “the author appears to have provided a lengthy quote from Papias.”
308 Lourié 2012. He defends the authenticity of the fragment briefly, but refers the reader to an earlier, Russian-language work which does so more comprehensively.
310 Körtner 1983.
315 Lourié 2013: 436.
316 So Shanks 2013: 249.
317 Lourié 2013: 441.
Hence, if the Armenian version preserves an authentic fragment of Papias, then it is clear that Papias’ work did refer to Satan and not merely bad angels in general. Although, as mentioned, Bauckham now rejects the authenticity of the Armenian fragments, this fragment also fits well with his hypothesis that Papias’ work began with an account of primeval history which he gave “a christological interpretation”.

Conclusions regarding Papias’ Satanology must remain tentative because of the huge proportion of his work that is lost, uncertainties surrounding the authenticity of Fragment 24, and uncertainties about the point where Fragments 11 and 24 break off. Nevertheless, from the part of Fragment 11 which is confidently attributed to Papias, it is evident that he held a mythological view of evil. To this we can add a fair probability that his work contained an account of Satan’s fall.

Even apart from the above evidence, it is difficult to see how Burke could conclude that of Papias that “He made no mention of satan or demons” given the large proportion of his five-volume work that is lost. Even if his work was just a collection of oral sayings from Jesus, it is quite likely that such a work would mention Satan and demons, given the large number of sayings of Jesus preserved in the Gospels that mention Satan or demons.

It is difficult to see how Burke can classify the Fragments of Papias as “non-mythological” when, in his own view, “no reliable data is available for illuminating Papias’ satanology”.

3.8. Epistles of Ignatius

One finds nothing problematic in Burke’s first two paragraphs on the Epistles of Ignatius, in which he deals briefly with introductory issues and then surveys the eleven instances of Satanological terminology spread across the seven extant epistles. Burke notes three terms used for Satan in the epistles: the devil (four times), Satan (once), and “the ruler of this age” (Ὄ ἄρχων τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου; six times).

Burke offers no comment on the possible literary-historical background to this latter designation. While it is unique to Ignatius among the NT and AF, the notion of Satan as a ‘ruler’ (ἄρχων) is widespread in early Christian literature. Superficially, John’s “the ruler of this world” (ὁ ἄρχων τοῦ κόσμου τούτου, John 12:31; 14:30; 16:11) may seem the closest prototype. However, Gokey regards οἱ ἄρχοντες τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου (1Cor 2.6-8) as the closest prototype for the Ignatian designation Ὄ ἄρχων τοῦ αἰῶνος.

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319 Bauckham 2014: 474.
320 Burke 2015: 41.
321 Burke 2015: 36.
322 IgnEph 10.3; IgnTral 8.1; IgnRom 5.3; IgnSmyrn 9.1
323 IgnEph 13.1
324 IgnEph 17.1; 19.1; IgnMag 1.2; IgnTral 4.2; IgnRom 7.1; IgnPhld 6.2. Schoedel states, “Ignatius often refers to the evil one in a traditional way as Satan (Eph. 13.1) or the devil (Eph. 10.3; Tr. 8.1; Rom. 5.3; Sm. 9.1). Here and in five other passages a somewhat more dualistic title appears: ‘ruler of this age’ (1985: 81n1).
325 Matt 12.24-29; Mark 3.22-27; Luke 11.15-21; John 12.31; 14:30; 16:11; Eph 2.2; cf. Barn 4.13; 18.2; AscnIns 1.3; 2.4; 4.2-4; 10.29; HermSim 1.3-67; Luke 4.5; Acts 26.18; 2Cor 4.4; 1John 5.19.
326 “John’s ‘ruler of this world’ is practically equivalent to Ignatius’ ‘ruler of this age’ since the bishop treats ‘world’ and ‘age’ as interchangeable” (Schoedel 1985: 81n1).
The latter term could have been derived by merging the plural expression from 1Cor 2.6-8 with the designation ὁ θεὸς τοῦ αἰῶνος τοῦτου from 2Cor 4.4. In support of this hypothesis one can point to the close conceptual parallel between 1Cor 2.8 and IgnEph 19.1. After briefly contemplating the possibility that these terms are used non-mythologically, he rightly observes that the statement about “the ruler of this age” in IgnEph 19.1 cannot be explained in terms of a human referent. Not only would Mary’s virginity have little relevance for a worldly statesman, but no single human ruler, such as Herod the Great or Augustus, was in power from the time of Jesus’ birth until his death. Additional evidence for the mythological nature of the Ignatian Satan can be seen in the association of Satan’s powers with heavenly warfare (IgnEph 13.1-2), and the implicit identification of the devil with the invisible realm (IgnTral 4.2-5.2; IgnRom 5.3). Robinson states that “Ignatius works with a simple dualism: one is either in the bishop’s church or outside it, one is either on God’s side or on the side of the prince of this world.” He adds that “one either comes under the authority of God and the bishop or under the power of the prince of this world – the real enemy for Ignatius.”

The range of functions and novelty of ideas associated with Satan suggests a robust Satanology on Ignatius’ part. Satan is at once a seducer and a bully. He is behind the persecution of the church (IgnMag 1.2; IgnRom 5.3; 7.1), but also behind false doctrine and insubordination within the church (IgnEph 10.3; 17.1; IgnSmyrn 9.1), as well as temptation more generally (IgnTral 8.1; IgnPhld 6.2). Moreover, he may be thwarted by unity in the church (IgnEph 13.1) and by humility (IgnTral 4.2). Burke’s comments about Ignatius’ Satanology are in line with this summary, although they are brief – perhaps because Burke is more interested in Satan’s putative absence from the AF than his presence.

Burke’s statements concerning the importance of Satanology within Ignatius’ explanatory recourse are not as emphatic as those about Barnabas, but they still reveal methodological flaws. He comments that Ignatius’ “consistent use of the devil as an explanation for all forms of evil and wrongdoing illustrates its importance to his theology.” This statement may be correct, but what Burke fails to acknowledge is

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327 Gokey 1961: 75n2. So also Schoedel (1985: 81n1), who thinks this terminology has close analogies in Paul, citing 1Cor. 2:6-8 (if this text has to do with cosmic rulers) and Eph. 2:2.
328 Schoedel (1985: 89) comments on IgnEph 19.1, “A passage in Paul already seems to refer to demonic powers who unwittingly work their own defeat by crucifying the Lord of glory (1 Cor 2:6-8).”
329 “The virginity of Mary and her giving birth escaped the notice of the ruler of this age; so too did the death of the Lord – three mysteries of a cry which were accomplished in the silence of God” (Ehrman 2003a: 239).
330 Schoedel (1985: 88-89) suggests two possible backgrounds to the ideas in IgnEph 19.1, both of which are attested by the second century: “(a) The evil one knew from OT prophecy that the Christ was coming but was uncertain whether Jesus was the one. (b) the powers did not know with whom they were dealing when they persecuted Jesus since he eluded detection when he descended through the heavens.” Obviously, both of these views require a mythological interpretation of Satan in this text.
331 The term ‘warfare’ here “has to do with angelic hostility” (Schoedel 1985: 74).
332 Robinson 2009: 125.
333 “Weed of the devil” means a heretic (Gokey 1961: 77n6; cf. IgnTral 6.1). Schoedel (1985: 69-70) disagrees. He acknowledges that plant imagery has to do with heresy elsewhere in Ignatius (IgnTral 6.1; IgnPhld 3.1), but argues that here “the concern is more general.”
334 Burke 2015: 38.
that Ignatius also makes recourse to anthropological, non-mythological categories in his hamartiology.\(^{335}\) His hamartiology appears to be modelled after Paul’s (despite some differences)\(^ {336}\) and, like Paul’s, is compatible with a role for Satan in the temptation process. Particularly striking is IgnPoly 4.3, which warns against setting slaves free through the common fund lest they become “slaves of lust.” This constitutes further evidence that (as we have seen with Barnabas and Hermas) anthropological hamartiology is not evidence of a non-mythological worldview.

Moreover, like Barnabas and Hermas, Ignatius’ prescribed Christian response to sin and Satan do not include overtly mythologically oriented methods\(^ {337}\) such as exorcism, but prayer, repentance, holiness, self-control, humility, gentleness, fellowship, unity and the like (IgnEph 10.1-3; 13.1-2; IgnTral 4.2; 8.1; IgnPhld 6.2). Striking are the statements in IgnEph 13.1-2 that when the church comes together, war is waged in heaven and Satan’s powers are vanquished;\(^ {338}\) and in IgnTral 4.2, “And so I need humility, by which the ruler of this age is destroyed.”\(^ {339}\) This corroborates the compatibility of such responses with a mythological worldview, and thus undermines Burke’s methodological assumption that non-mythological responses to sin imply a non-mythological worldview.

Notably, in his letters to established Christian congregations in six different locations spanning Italy, Greece and Asia, Ignatius shows no hint that his depiction of Satan is in any way innovative or controversial. Four of these six locations are recipients of epistles within the New Testament which

\(^{335}\) He uses zoological imagery in IgnEph 7.1 to describe the wickedness of heretics. In IgnEph 8.2, an apparent allusion to Rom 8:5, 8 (cf. Ehrman 2003a: 227n2), he states, “Those who belong to the flesh cannot do spiritual things”. Those who live according to the flesh will die, and those who corrupt the faith are “filthy” (IgnEph 16.2; cf. IgnRom 8.3). The Magnesians are instructed, “No one should consider his neighbour in a fleshly way, but you should love one another in Jesus Christ at all times” (IgnMag 6.2). The Trallians are commended because “you appear to me not to live in a human way but according to Jesus Christ” (IgnTral 2.1). The Romans are told, “Let no envy dwell among you... My passion has been crucified” (IgnRom 7.2). He warns the Philadelphia about “seemingly trustworthy wolves [who] use wicked pleasure to capture those who run in God’s race” (IgnPhld 2.2). In IgnMag 5.2 the conflict is between God and the world (not between God and Satan). Schoedel (1985: 23n119) notes that for Ignatius, “the term ‘world’ evidently refers to (a) a sphere opposed to God…(b) the world of people hostile to Christianity…(c) the realm of matter...insofar as Satan inflames an unhealthy affection for it”.

\(^{336}\) Commenting on IgnEph 8.2, Schoedel writes that Ignatius “begins the passage by stating the contrast between ‘fleshy’ and ‘spiritual’ people in a Pauline manner (cf. Rom 8:5; 1 Cor 2:14-15; Gal 5:16-26) that he otherwise avoids...The declaration of the coinherence of the spheres of flesh and spirit at the anthropological level mirrors their coinherence at the christological level (Eph. 7.2; cf. Sm. 3)” (1985: 64). Commenting on the difference between Ignatius and Paul in terms of flesh/spirit duality, he notes, “Here the presupposition is that the flesh represents not the sphere of sin but the sphere of corruptibility. Thus Ignatius preaches a gospel of the spiritual transformation of all that is fleshly” (1985: 23).

\(^{337}\) This language is used cautiously since, of course, responses like prayer and the Eucharist may well be mythologically oriented. Prayer invokes the assistance of unseen divine beings!

\(^{338}\) Schoedel (1985: 203) comments on IgnPhld 6.2, “The main effect of the devil’s activity is to negate ‘love.’ Common worship is the cure (cf. [IgnEph] 13.”

\(^{339}\) Commenting on IgnTral 8.1, Schoedel (1985: 149-150) writes, “The ability of the Trallians to resist Satan is described in terms of a renewal of faith and love” and “The corollary of the self-renewal of the Trallians against the snares of the devil (that is, against pride) is now stated: having nothing against one’s neighbor.”
mention Satan. It is quite probable, then, that Ignatius’ Satan concept is similar to that which had been mentioned in correspondence with the same churches only a few years or decades earlier.

Finally, the absence of any reference to Satan in Ignatius’ letter to Polycarp shows that he did not consider it obligatory to mention this concept in his letters. This also serves as a reminder of the peril of arguments from silence when reconstructing the place of Satan in a particular writer’s theology. Had only this letter survived, there is little doubt that Burke would claim that Ignatius had a non-mythological worldview!

Moving on to Ignatius’ demonology, Burke comments that “Ignatius uses daimonion as a reference to a disembodied post-mortem spirit like a ghost, rather than to a supernatural evil being”. This is an odd dichotomy: a ghost would be a supernatural being, and it is unclear on what grounds Burke concludes that such a being could not be evil.

In this passage, IgnSmyrn 2.1, the writer warns concerning Docetists who deny a physical resurrection that they themselves will become δαιμονικοῖς. Burke follows Holmes’ translation “demonic”, while Ehrman has “like the demons” and Gokey has “demonlike”. BDAG defines the word as “pertaining to being like a spirit or phantom”. Ignatius is not necessarily equating post-mortem existence with being a demon but with being like a demon. In similar fashion, in IgnSmyrn 3.2, Ignatius quotes an otherwise unknown Jesus tradition comparable to Luke 24:39 but distinct in terminology, saying that in a resurrection appearance Jesus told the disciples, “Reach out, touch me and see that I am not a bodiless demon (δαιμόνιον ἀσώματον).” Burke comments:

In context, Ignatius is clearly addressing the disciples’ fear that Jesus was not physically present, rather than addressing a concern that Jesus had become transformed into a demon.

It is possible that in the Jesus logion, δαιμόνιον takes the sense of any departed soul, a sense it bore in later Greek. However, Burke seems not to have grasped Ignatius’ polemical edge in IgnSmyrn 2.1. Schoedel argues that the terminology in 2.1 is prompted by that in 3.2. He explains the background as follows:

the docetists apparently spoke of the resurrection positively and probably taught a spiritualized version of it; and thus Ignatius’ reference to their becoming bodiless and demonic must also have functioned to make the point not only that they would lack bodily substance (which would

341 Burke 2015: 38.
342 Holmes 2007: 251; so also Schoedel 1985: 225.
343 Ehrman 2003a: 297.
346 Ehrman 2003a: 299.
347 Burke 2015: 38.
not have concerned them) but also that what they thought of as a rarefied spiritual state would in fact be ‘demonic’ in character.\textsuperscript{349}

Schoedel goes on to explain the key to Ignatius’ rhetoric:

the wordplay did not involve the term ‘spiritual’ but had to do with the use of the term ‘demonic’ (phantom-like) in the saying of Jesus, taken more or less accurately as the key to docetic theology by Ignatius, and his use of the same term in a different sense (anti-divine) to express disapproval.\textsuperscript{350}

Hence, the demonology that Ignatius presupposes here is not merely about ghosts but something more sinister. In a more detailed study of this text, Proctor comes to a similar conclusion. While he notes that Mitchell’s recent paper defends the translation ‘phantom’ in IgnSmyrn 3.2,\textsuperscript{351} he argues instead that Ignatius exhibits “an ‘apocalyptic’ daimonology, where daimons were understood as part of a pervasive onslaught of evil powers” whose origin was rooted in the Watchers myth.\textsuperscript{352} Commenting specifically on the claims that ‘demon’ is a neutral term synonymous with ‘phantom’ in IgnSmyrn, Proctor states:

To put it succinctly, daimons are almost exclusively evil within early Christian literature, and carried increasingly sinister undertones within ‘pagan’ Greek literature at the time when Ignatius’ letters would have been composed and initially interpreted. In light of this larger tradition, it is highly improbable that Ignatius’ opponents (or other Christians) would equate the risen Jesus with a daimon, and such usage does not correspond to the docetic terminology attested in our ancient sources (i.e., ‘phantasmal,’ ‘angelic,’ and ‘pneumatic’).\textsuperscript{353}

Hence, for Ignatius, “Jesus’ denial that he is a ‘bodiless daimon’ functions as a rhetorical absurdity, implying that Ignatius’ opponents equate the risen Jesus with an (evil) daimon.”\textsuperscript{354}

Proctor goes on to note that Gnostic texts often value bodiless existence, so that if Ignatius had condemned his docetic opponents to a phantasmal afterlife, “it likely would have been met with indifference.”\textsuperscript{355} Instead, Ignatius associates docetic Christians “with daimons, entities that were not only bodiless, but also, within Christian circles, malevolent, monstrous, and destined for a morose afterlife.”\textsuperscript{356}

Hence, when read in the context of Ignatius’ rhetorical purpose, ‘demon’ is seen to refer to a supernatural being with a decidedly negative connotation, as elsewhere in early Christian tradition.

\textsuperscript{349} Schoedel 1985: 225-226.
\textsuperscript{350} Schoedel 1985: 226n5.
\textsuperscript{351} Mitchell 2010: 224.
\textsuperscript{352} Proctor 2013: 185 (note: page numbers for Proctor are approximate since I do not have access to the published version but only a pre-submission draft available on academia.edu). On this myth see Stuckenbruck 2004b: 112; Segal 2004: 151-152.
\textsuperscript{353} Proctor 2013: 187.
\textsuperscript{354} Proctor 2013: 196.
\textsuperscript{355} Proctor 2013: 200.
\textsuperscript{356} Proctor 2013: 200.
Accordingly, we can set aside Burke’s claim that, “Remarkably, Ignatius shows no knowledge of *daimonion* as a reference to a supernatural evil being”.  

Burke ends his discussion of Ignatius’ demonology here but there are other texts which suggest a belief in evil supernatural beings. The statement in IgnRom 5.3, “May nothing visible or invisible (τῶν ὄρατῶν καὶ ἀοράτων) show any envy toward me, that I may attain to Jesus Christ”, made in the immediate context of a reference to the devil, implies the existence of two distinct, populated realms: the visible and the invisible. This distinction parallels Col 1:16, which uses it to make exhaustive the list of creatures created through the Son. ‘Invisibility’ as a defining characteristic of the spirit world appears elsewhere in the Pauline corpus and in Hebrews, chiefly as an attribute of God (Rom 1.20; 1Tim 1.17; Heb 11.3; 11.27; cf. Matt 6.6; 6.18; 2Cor 4.18).

Schoedel further regards the ‘aeons’ of IgnEph 19.2 as likely a reference to supernatural beings.

A third reference to such invisible beings is found in IgnSmyrn 6.1: “Judgment is prepared even for the heavenly beings, for the glory of the angels, and for the rulers both visible and invisible, if they do not believe in the blood of Christ.” Ignatius, like Col 1:16, affirms the existence of invisible ‘rulers’. He equates them with angelic, heavenly beings who are, at least potentially, subject to unbelief and judgment (cf. Rom 8.38; 1Cor 6.3; 2Pet 2:4; Jude 6). Ignatius also regards invisibility as a characteristic of God (IgnMag 3.2; IgnPoly 3.2).

A very significant text for understanding Ignatius’ view of the invisible realm is IgnTral 5.1-2. Immediately following a reference to the ruler of this age (4.2), he writes:

> Am I not able to write to you about heavenly things? **But I am afraid that I may harm you who are still infants. Grant me this concession – otherwise you may choke, not being able to swallow enough.** For not even I am a disciple already, simply because I am in bondage and am able to understand the heavenly realms and the angelic regions and hierarchies of the cosmic rulers, both visible and invisible. For many things are still lacking to us, that we may not be lacking God.

These remarks imply that the ruler of this age pertains to heavenly things and is a (presumably invisible) ruler in the heavenly realms, reinforcing the mythological nature of Ignatius’ Satanology. Furthermore,

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357 Burke 2015: 38.
358 Schoedel (1985: 180) thinks that Ignatius has the devil primarily in mind here, which is surely true; yet the generality of the statement presupposes other potentially envious beings, both visible and invisible.
359 Schoedel 1985: 91n24. He notes, however, that the word αἰῶνες elsewhere in Ignatius means ‘ages’ (cf. IgnEph 8.1).
360 “The reference to the heavenly powers as possible believers or unbelievers in the passion is partly ad hoc. But it also indicates that Ignatius conceives of the heavens in apocalyptic fashion as occupied by angels who have fallen as well as by those who have not. In particular, he may have in mind the powers mentioned in Eph. 19.2-3 as thrown into confusion by the star and destroyed by the incarnation. For the ‘judgment’ reserved for fallen angels see especially Jude 6, which in turn harks back to the apocalyptic tradition (cf. 1 Enoch 10.4-16)” (Schoedel 1985: 236n32).
Ignatius here implies that ‘heavenly things’ (τὰ ἐπουράνια, cf. Eph 1.3; 1.20; 2.6; 3.10; 6.12) pertaining to the spirit world are not basic principles suitable for spiritual infants, but advanced subjects which could confuse those too immature to understand them. This statement provides some evidence that teachings about Satan and demons were not regarded in the early church as suitable for the uninitiated. As noted earlier, this may help to explain the Didachist’s apparent decision to exclude angelology from his Two Ways catechetical material.

3.9.2 Clement

After a very brief comment on introductory issues, Burke mentions the one use of διάβολος in this work (2Clem 18.2). Although 2Clement is generally regarded as the work of a different author from 1Clement, this text bears incidental resemblance to the reference to Satan in 1Clem 51.1. In both cases the writer professes his own sinfulness and attributes temptation to a definite entity using a genitive construction:

For even I myself am completely sinful and have not yet fled temptation and am still surrounded by the instruments of the Devil (καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς πανθαμαρτωλὸς ὁν καὶ μήτω φεύγων τὸν πεισμὸν, ἀλλ’ ἔτι ὃν ἐν μέσοις τοῖς ὄργανοι τοῦ διάβολον). Burke concedes that this “appears to be a natural reference to a supernatural evil being”. However, he proceeds to argue that things are not as they appear. The preceding text “presents an ethical dualism in an eschatological context”, and fails to mention the devil and his angels, “despite the use of Matthew 25:31-46”. This he calls “remarkable”. While the writer of 2Clement seems to know the Gospel of Matthew, and 17.4-7 contains “echoes of the scene in Matt. 25.31-46”, it does not appear to contain any explicit quotations from this passage, and is silent on many of the themes mentioned

362 “For he says he can write about heavenly things as well as anyone and that his reason for refraining to do so is merely the immaturity of the Trallians: he is afraid they will choke on food too solid for them to swallow. We learn what esoteric knowledge Ignatius has in mind: ‘heavenly things’... The language suggests that Ignatius associates stars and planets with the angels or the ‘archontic’ powers (as in Origen Cels. 6.27-33; cf. Justin Dial. 36.4-6). What we apparently have here is a mixture of astrological and apocalyptic ideas similar to that found in [IgnEph] 19.1-3” (Schoedel 1985: 144-156).
364 Burke 2015: 38.
365 Burke 2015: 39. He cites Grant (2006) in support of this observation, but Grant is actually discussing a different issue, namely, the background to Irenaeus’ description of the writings of “Clement”, which includes that God “prepared fire for the devil and his angels” (Adv.Haer. 3.3.3; trans. Grant 2006: 7). This does not correspond to any statement in extant manuscripts of 1Clement. Grant notes the view of Botte that Irenaeus is combining (or confusing) 1Clement with 2Clement (so also Richardson 1952: 153; cf. Tuckett 2012: 7-8), but he doubts this because, while 2Clement refers to an eschatological fire and to the devil in close proximity (17.6-7, 18.2), he does not refer to fire prepared for the devil and his angels. Grant concludes that “Irenaeus is making 1 Clement his own” (2006: 188n25). In fact, it is more likely that Irenaeus is making 2 Clement his own by conflating 2Clem 17.6-18.2 with Matt. 25:41. So Lona (1998: 93), “II Clem sagt zwar nichts über den Teufel und seine Engel, aber die Erwähnung des nie erlöschen Feuers hätte die freie Assoziation hervorgebracht.”
367 Tuckett 2012: 283.
there.\textsuperscript{368} What is remarkable is that Burke can make something out of this silence, especially when the devil is mentioned immediately thereafter in 18.2!

Burke again thinks it is “remarkable” that “there is no use in 2 Clement of satanas as a proper name.”\textsuperscript{369} He does not explain why this is remarkable. Returning to 2Clem 18.2, Burke thinks that, because there is just this one reference to ὁ διάβολος in the document, he has marshaled enough evidence to conclude that this entity “reads naturally as a referent to non-supernatural opposition.” Burke footnotes this statement with two sources, but neither of them supports his claim of a non-supernatural referent. Both are discussing the significance of τοῖς ὀργάνοις (the ‘instruments’ or ‘tools’) and not the referent of τοῦ διαβόλου.\textsuperscript{370}

Burke’s exegesis leaves much to be desired. In the first place, he inexplicably takes no account of the consistent early Christian use of ὁ διάβολος as a designation for Satan. Wallace even argues that ὁ διάβολος is a “monadic noun” in the NT, a noun with only one meaning.\textsuperscript{371} Similarly, in \textit{all of patristic literature}, Lampe finds only four occurrences of διάβολος which do not refer to the devil!\textsuperscript{372} All four are anarthrous, unlike in 2Clem 18.2. Three of the four appear to be dependent on the Pastoral Epistles’ usage. The fourth case dates from around the end of the fifth century and uses the word to describe what the devil is like. One would have to produce very strong counterarguments to avoid taking ὁ διάβολος to refer to the devil in an early Christian text – particularly a text which associates ὁ διάβολος with πειρασμός (cf. Matt 4.1-11; 1Cor 7.5; 1Thess 3.5).

One should also bear in mind the hypothesis that the lost \textit{Book of Eldad and Modad} is the unknown ‘prophetic word’ quoted in 2Clem 11.2-4. If (as discussed above) this source was also responsible for the tradition about the devil fleeing those who resist him,\textsuperscript{373} then one can surmise that the author of 2Clement was influenced by a similar idea.

\textsuperscript{368} E.g. throne, angels, sheep and goats, dialogue between Jesus and those he judges, treatment of the least of Christ’s brethren as the basis of judgment

\textsuperscript{369} Burke 2015: 39.

\textsuperscript{370} Wallace 1996: 222-224. Possible exceptions are the three plural references to διάβολοι in the PE and the anarthrous διάβολος in John 6:70. But Wallace regards the PE cases as adjectival and John 6:70 as a figurative reference to the devil, which should be considered semantically definite under Colwell's Rule. A full exegesis of these texts cannot detain us here; it is virtually uncontested, however, that διάβολος is a technical term meaning 'devil' in the vast majority of NT instances.

\textsuperscript{371} PolPhil 5.2; Const. ap. 3.12.3; Chrysostom Hom. 2 Tim. 8.1; Procopius Gazaenus, exegetica Gen. 1.2.

\textsuperscript{372} Preserved in Jas 4:7; HermMan 12.4.7-12.5.2; cf. TDan 5.1; TNaph 8.4.
All told, there is no reason to doubt that 2Clem 18.2 refers to the devil. This interpretation has considerable scholarly support,\(^{374}\) including from the scholars cited by Burke in support of his view! The devil’s ‘instruments’ or ‘tools’ are obviously metaphorical. This may be a military metaphor similar to Eph 6:16,\(^{375}\) the tools themselves may refer to people.\(^{376}\)

Burke again argues based on the description of idolatry in 2Clem 1.6 (cf. 3.1) that the author shows no knowledge of a demonic dimension to pagan religion. This may be true, but the brief statements here do not necessarily represent a full account of his views about idolatry (see below on Diognetus).

A possible further reference to Satan (not noted by Burke) occurs in 2Clem 20.4:

> For if God were to reward the upright immediately, we would straightaway be engaged in commerce rather than devotion to God. For we would appear to be upright not for the sake of piety but for a profit. And for this reason, a divine judgment harms the spirit that is not upright and burdens it with chains (καὶ διὰ τοῦτο θεία κρίσις ἐβλαψεν πνεῦμα μὴ ὅν δίκαιον, καὶ ἐβάρυνεν δεσμοῖς).

As Tuckett states, the identity of the πνεῦμα here is not clear.\(^{377}\) Possibilities include (1) a particular member of the community, “known perhaps to be ‘not righteous’ who has fallen ill and/or died”. The main problem with this theory is that it is unclear why such a person would be referred to as a πνεῦμα. (2) One of the Watchers (Jub 5.10; 1En 10.4; Jude 6; 2Pet 2.4). In favour of this are the reference to ‘chains’ and the likelihood that the Watchers are the referent of ‘spirits’ in 1Pet 3.19.\(^{378}\) However, it is unclear why πνεῦμα should be singular or how such a referent would fit the context. (3) Satan. However, the anarthrous πνεῦμα would be an odd way to refer to Satan. There is no precedent for Satan to be referred to as a spirit (the genitive πνεῦματος in Eph 2.2 refers to what the devil rules over, not the devil himself). Moreover, as Tuckett observes, “the binding of Satan’ is usually thought of as something which will happen in the eschatological future”.

All three of these interpretations are beset with problems, and Tuckett suggests that we may have to admit ignorance. In my view, the interpretation that fits best with the context is that the judgment is temporal and reformatory and the chains are therefore metaphorical. The idea expressed is a corollary of the delayed reward of the upright: those who are not upright undergo punishment immediately in the hopes that they may repent. The word πνεῦμα would emphasize the spiritual nature of the burdening and the desire for spiritual, eternal consequences (cf. 1Cor 5.5). Hence, it is unlikely that this passage refers to Satan or a demon, but given its obscurity, this cannot be entirely ruled out.


\(^{375}\) So Pratscher 2007: 217.

\(^{376}\) Arndt et al 2000: 226, 720.

\(^{377}\) Tuckett 2012: 301.

In summary, the writer of 2Clement demonstrates a belief in the devil in 18.2. That there is only one cursory reference to this figure does not justify claims that he viewed the devil non-mythologically. Rather, the brevity of the reference implies that he is using this terminology in its usual sense and not innovating.

### 3.10. Epistle to Diognetus

Burke describes this work as a ‘letter’ but does not mention that it is regarded as a composite work consisting of an apology (chapters 1-10) and a homily (chapters 11-12).\(^{379}\) It is generally dated to “the late second century or the early third”\(^{380}\) or “to some moment during the 2nd century, with a preference for the latter decades of that period”.\(^{381}\) Recently Williams stated, “The majority of scholars date it to 200”.\(^{382}\) Based on the likelihood of such a late date, it is of limited value for reconstructing Christian Satanology in the period generally covered by the AF: late first century to mid second century. Nevertheless, since it is traditionally included among the AF, we proceed.

One can agree with Burke that the work contains no reference to Satan or demons, at least as far as the apologetic portion is concerned, in its extant form.\(^{383}\) Furthermore, the description of idols as ‘lifeless and dead’ and the lack of reference to demonic complicity sets this work apart from most of the Apologists. This certainly reflects a different rhetorical strategy; whether it reflects a different theological outlook is doubtful. After all, whereas Ehrman emphasizes the *difference* between Justin’s view and that in Diognetus,\(^{384}\) Richardson (also cited by Burke) actually emphasizes the *agreement* between Diog 2 and Justin’s 1Apol 9.\(^{385}\) Justin argues that the “objects that people have formed and set in temples and named gods” are “lifeless and dead.”\(^{386}\) Furthermore, they “have not the form of God...but have the names and shapes of those evil demons which have appeared”. Diog 2.5. echoes the

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\(^{379}\) Foster (2006: 164) states, “It can be seen that whereas the first chapters have an apologetic focus, the final two have inner ecclesial concerns.” See also Jefford 2013: 12. Foster also observes, “These sections appear to represent two distinct sources that have been combined during the process of transmission. The identification of this seam is supported by a marginal note in the manuscript at the end of chapter 10 which reads ‘and here the copy has a break’” (2006: 163).

\(^{380}\) Grant 1988: 178.

\(^{381}\) Jefford 2013: 28.

\(^{382}\) Williams 2015: 568.

\(^{383}\) Arguments from silence are particularly precarious when built upon incomplete texts. In addition to the break mentioned by Foster (see above), there is a lacuna at 7.6 and, as Ehrman comments, “there is no way to know how much of the intervening text has been lost, whether just a few words or a page or more” (Ehrman 2003b: 124). The lacuna occurs in an eschatological section, and Jefford states that “the textual lacuna complicates any interpretation of the eschatological context. One thus cannot know what further materials on this topic may have originally been here or reconstruct the missing words that may once have served to explain what now appears as a sudden turn of theme” (2013: 232). There is no evidence that the missing portion of text made reference to Satan, but we also cannot say otherwise with certainty.

\(^{384}\) Ehrman 2003b: 126.

\(^{385}\) Richardson (1970/1995: 215n9): “Against most of the Apologists, who think of idols as dwellings of demons, the Epistle agrees with Justin’s description of them as ‘lifeless and dead’”. See the quotations from Horsley and Meecham above (Section 3.1.3), on how the early Christian view that idols are dead was compatible with the view that demons lurk behind idolatry.

\(^{386}\) Barnard 1997: 27, trans.
first part of Justin’s argument: idols are deaf, blind, lifeless, etc. This writer stops short of saying anything comparable to Justin’s second assertion, but he also says nothing which contradicts it. Arguably, he simply does not press the point as far as Justin does. Indeed, after his lengthy diatribe about the idols’ lifelessness, he concludes:

I could say many other things about why Christians do not serve such gods, but if someone supposes that these comments are not enough, I imagine saying anything more would be superfluous. (Diog 2.10)\textsuperscript{387}

It is possible that the ‘many other things’ which the writer alludes to includes the demonic nature of idolatry, since we have evidence earlier than Diognetus which shows that this was one of the reasons why Christians did not serve such gods.\textsuperscript{388} Once again, an argument from silence is not decisive.\textsuperscript{389}

We now turn our attention to three references to “the serpent” (ὁ ὄφις) in Diog 12.3-8. Burke does not deal with this passage directly, but only notes in passing that “his hamartiology does not identify the serpent as Satan”, citing Jefford in support. Yet not only has Burke failed to engage scholarly views comprehensively; he has failed to engage Jefford’s views comprehensively!

For, while Jefford does observe that the writer does not use the terms ‘devil’ or ‘Satan’ or explicitly identify the serpent as such,\textsuperscript{390} he elsewhere states that the serpent seems allegorical and that the writer appears to assume a link between the serpent of Genesis and the great dragon of Revelation\textsuperscript{391} (which is explicitly identified as an allegorical depiction of Satan).

Gokey notes that while the “deceit of the serpent” in 12.3 (referring to the events in Eden) does not require an active interpretation, the deceit by the serpent in 12.6 “would favour an active interpretation”.\textsuperscript{392} Similarly “the serpent cannot touch such things nor can deceit defile them” (12.8) suggests an active meaning. Among lexical authorities, BDAG regards the serpent in v. 6 as “clearly the devil”,\textsuperscript{393} while Lampe also identifies the serpent here with the devil.\textsuperscript{394} Such an interpretation of the serpent of Genesis 3 was already a well-established tradition in the church by the time this text was written.\textsuperscript{395}

It should be stressed that the identification of the serpent with Satan here seems to be allegorical rather than literal. The writer is not implicating Satan in the events of Eden. Rather, he first refers historically to

\textsuperscript{387} Ehrman 2003b: 135.
\textsuperscript{388} Cf. 1Cor. 10:19-21; Rev. 9:2; Dial. 19; 27; 55; 73; 79; 83; 119; 133; 1Apol. 41 (this list is taken from Reed 2005: 166n8). Gokey (1961: 100) also thinks this idea is implicit in Barn 16.7.
\textsuperscript{389} Having noted that most of the Apologists believed in the malignant influence of demons, Meecham adds, “The author of Diognetus gives no hint that he held the general view, though we may not, \textit{e silentio}, conclude the contrary” (1949: 22).
\textsuperscript{390} Jefford 2013: 102; so also Russell 1987: 46n49.
\textsuperscript{391} Jefford 2013: 254-255.
\textsuperscript{392} Gokey 1961: 118-119n12
\textsuperscript{393} Arndt et al 2000: 744.
\textsuperscript{394} Lampe 1961: 989.
\textsuperscript{395} Dochhorn 2007b: 195.
the serpent in Eden (12.3), and then proceeds to use Edenic imagery (serpent, tree, Eve\textsuperscript{396}) allegorically to describe the present circumstances of the church. Whatever the serpent symbol denotes, it is an active force which can deceive the ignorant (12.6) but cannot touch the knowledgeable and reverent (12.8).

It is impossible to be certain about the referent of the serpent symbol since the writer does not explain it. However, while it is possible that the serpent symbolizes sin, or the evil inclination, the consistent early Christian witness to the use of serpent imagery for Satan (Rom 16:20;\textsuperscript{397} 2Cor 11:3 cp. 11:14; Rev 12:7-9; 20:2; Justin, 1Apol 28; numerous references in Dial.; cf. LAE) makes it more likely that the referent is Satan.

3.11. Fragment of Quadratus

Quadratus’ apology survives only in a brief fragment preserved by Eusebius (EcclHist 4.3). This fragment makes no mention of Satan, demons, or of evil in any form, for that matter. Burke comments, “This fragment is insufficient a witness from which to draw comprehensive conclusions on Quadratus’ beliefs concerning supernatural evil”.\textsuperscript{398} He ought to have removed the word ‘comprehensive’ and left the matter there. However, he cannot resist yet another argument from silence: he calls it “remarkable” that “people are said to have been ‘healed of their diseases’ and ‘healed’, but there is no reference to demon possession or illness resulting from affliction by Satan or demons”. Consequently, “the text itself is completely non-mythological.”

How sound is this argument from silence? ‘Of their diseases’ is not present in the Greek, which simply uses the verb θεραπεύω (‘to heal’) twice in passive participial forms. So the text simply refers to people who were ‘healed’ and ‘raised from the dead’. Is the fact that Quadratus does not explicitly mention exorcism here significant?

In Justin’s Second Apology he “associates possession with an illness, and considers the essence of exorcism to be healing”\textsuperscript{399} (cf. 2Apol 6.5-6). If Quadratus thought in the same terms, he could have considered Christ’s exorcisms to be included in the word ‘healed’. Even if not, it is clear that Quadratus did not provide a full catalogue of the kinds of miracles that a Saviour might be expected to perform. Evidently his argument in this particular passage does not rest on the diversity of afflictions that Christ was able to address, but on the lasting impact that his works had: “even when he had gone they remained for a long time, so that some of them have survived to our own time.”\textsuperscript{400}

In summary, apart from the intrinsic futility of an argument from silence based upon a 49-word fragment from a larger, lost work, the context gives us no specific reason to think that Quadratus’ ought

\textsuperscript{396} “Eve” in 12.8 seems to allegorically represent either Mary or the church (Jefford 2013: 47, 77, 110, 255; he vacillates between the two interpretations).
\textsuperscript{397} On this text, see Dochhorn 2007b.
\textsuperscript{398} Burke 2015: 41.
\textsuperscript{400} Ehrman 2003b: 119.
to have explicitly mentioned Christ’s exorcisms here if he was aware of them and thought them significant.

4. Summary of Findings

Burke concludes by providing a summative list of supernatural evil in the Apostolic Fathers. Instead of resorting to his categories according to levels of mythology, I will provide a simpler classification system for writings. The table below shows my findings (with composite works divided into their constituent parts).

**Classification of Apostolic Fathers according to references to Satan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Texts which almost certainly mention Satan</td>
<td>Epistle of Barnabas, 1Clement, Shepherd of Hermas (Mandates, Similitudes), Polycarp’s Epistle to the Philippians, Martyrdom of Polycarp, Epistles of Ignatius (Ephesians, Magnesians, Romans, Philadelphians, Trallians, Smyrnaeans), 2Clement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texts which probably mention Satan</td>
<td>Didache, Epistle to Diognetus (homiletic portion), Papias</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texts which probably do not mention Satan</td>
<td>Epistle to Diognetus (apologetic portion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texts which almost certainly do not mention Satan</td>
<td>Hermas (Visions), Ignatius’ Epistle to Polycarp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texts for which no conclusion is possible</td>
<td>Apology of Quadratus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Classification of Apostolic Fathers according to references to other supernatural evil beings (e.g. demons, evil spirits, bad angels)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Texts which almost certainly mention other supernatural evil beings</td>
<td>Epistle of Barnabas, Shepherd of Hermas (Mandates), Epistles of Ignatius (Romans, Trallians, Smyrnaeans), Papias</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texts which probably mention other supernatural evil beings</td>
<td>Didache, Ignatius’ Epistle to the Ephesians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texts which probably do not mention other supernatural evil beings</td>
<td>2Clement, Epistle to Diognetus (apologetic portion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texts which almost certainly do not mention other supernatural evil beings</td>
<td>1Clement, Hermas (Visions, Similitudes), Polycarp’s Epistle to the Philippians, Martyrdom of Polycarp, Epistles of Ignatius (Magnesians, Philadelphians, Polycarp), Epistle to Diognetus (homiletic portion),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texts for which no conclusion is possible</td>
<td>Apology of Quadratus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What conclusions can we draw regarding Satan in the AF? Firstly, discounting Quadratus due to the small amount of data available from him, we probably have ten authors represented in this corpus. Among them, *all ten*, based on our extant texts, can be said at least probably to have mentioned Satan, and seven can be said with near-certainty to have mentioned Satan.
Broadly speaking, the AF represent a continuation of the same picture that emerges from the NT: a rich and coherent Satan concept shared across all strands of early Christian tradition. These writings show that Satan was a consistent feature of Christian theology during the period roughly from the late first century until the mid-second century, in different parts of the Empire. Geographic regions represented by this corpus (either in terms of provenance or destination) include Italy (1 Clement, Hermas, Ignatius to the Romans), Greece (Ignatius to the Magnesians, Polycarp to the Philippians, 1 Clement), Asia (Ignatius to the Ephesians, Trallians, Philadelphians, Smyrnaeans, Polycarp, Polycarp to the Philippians, Martyrdom of Polycarp), Syria-Palestine (Epistles of Ignatius, Didache), and Alexandria (Barnabas, possibly 2 Clement). That Christian Satanology – a concept with Jewish rather than Hellenistic roots – was so widely distributed in the early second century suggests that it spread with the gospel in the early stages of Christian mission.

What is also noteworthy is that none of these Christian writers make any effort to persuade their readers of the reality of Satan, or show any hint that this reality is a controversial issue within the church. The references to Satan are consistently cursory and without explanation, suggesting a well-known, traditional concept with which the readers are assumed to be familiar. Moreover, while some of the AF use terminology for Satan not found in the NT (e.g., ‘the black one’, ‘the agent’), there is very little systematic reflection about Satan. All of this supports the view that the AF writers are transmitting tradition rather than innovating.

Obviously, the level of emphasis on Satan is not constant across the different documents: Satan clearly plays a larger role in Barnabas than in 1 Clement. Nevertheless, differing emphases on Satan need not imply conflicting Satanologies.

Turning to other supernatural evil beings, these are somewhat less prominent in the AF than Satan is. Only five authors probably or almost certainly mention such beings, while five probably or almost certainly do not. Only three writers – Hermas, Ignatius, and Barnabas – seem to give significant attention to the spirit world in general. Angels, for instance, are never mentioned in Didache, 2 Clement or Polycarp to the Philippians, mentioned only once in the extant text of Diognetus (7.2), twice in the Martyrdom of Polycarp (2.3; 14.1), and six times in 1 Clement – of which all but one (34.5), however, occur in quotations from other sources. There is really no text which shows a strong interest in good sub-divine supernatural beings but not evil sub-divine supernatural beings. One observes the same heterogeneity in levels of interest in demonology that one finds in the NT. The heterogeneity does not necessarily reflect different theological outlooks, but rather different genres, subject matter and rhetorical purposes. In general, a reference to Satan (as opposed to his minions) seems to have sufficed when an early Christian writer wanted to mention supernatural forces of evil. On the whole, one can probably say that mythological motifs are not too pronounced in the Apostolic Fathers. However, they are present, and so one should resist classifying these writings as non-mythological or demythologized.

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401 It is only in the later part of the second century, as a Christian canon takes shape, that the writers of the church begin to systematize the various elements of mythological evil found in their texts.
402 As discussed earlier, it is possible that the Didache’s lost ending mentioned angels coming with the Lord.
There is a possibility — subject to debate, as we have seen — that the Didachist and 1Clement show tendencies toward demythologization in certain contexts. However this does not on its own indicate a non-mythological or anti-mythological worldview but may rather reflect rhetorical purpose in a specific context. Conclusive evidence for a non-mythological or anti-mythological view of evil would take the form of polemic against, or explicit repudiation of, belief in mythological evil beings such as Satan or demons. One would also expect to find polemic against non-mythological or anti-mythological views of evil in mythologically inclined writings. All such evidence is totally absent from early Christian literature; and that is an argument from silence which, for me, carries some weight. Specifically, it casts serious doubt upon Burke’s claim that two streams of Christian tradition – one mythological and one non-mythological – were competing during the second century, with the mythological school eventually prevailing. The alleged representatives of the non-mythological school never explicitly repudiate belief in mythological evil, while the representatives of the mythological school make no effort to defend their position against a competing non-mythological school. There is, in short, no evidence in early Christian literature that a theological debate took place concerning Satan and/or demons.

5. Assessment of Burke’s Findings

For a critique of Burke’s methodology, see ‘Hermeneutical Approach’. Here we focus on his findings.

Let us begin with Satan. Burke correctly identifies the mythological Satan figure in Barnabas, Ignatius and Hermas (Mandates and Similitudes). However, in all other texts he denies that such a figure is present. In Hermas, moreover, he takes the seemingly unprecedented view that the writer’s view of the spirit world changed radically over the several decades thought to have elapsed between the composition of Visions 1-4 and the later parts of the work. This is one of many arguments from silence that undergird Burke’s reconstruction of the AF writers’ theology.

His view that Satan is absent from the theology of the authors of Didache and Diognetus rests on an argument from silence – and a precarious silence at that. His analysis of Did 8.2 and 16.4 fails to take the full breadth of exegetical evidence into account. In the case of Did 8.2, his support for the assertion that there is no pre-Christian witness for ὁ πονηρός as a term for a supernatural being actually comes from a source which provides that very evidence. His exegesis of Did 16.4 ignores important parallels in early Christian literature while also relying on an inadequate review of recent scholarship. Meanwhile his claims regarding Did 1.1 go well beyond the evidence into the realm of conjecture. His exegesis of ‘the serpent’ in Diog 12 consists of observing that it is not explicitly identified as Satan. However, he ignores the depiction of the serpent as an active force, indicating an allegorical referent.

In the case of Papias his conclusion is not impossible, but he reaches it by very superficial argumentation. He offers no critical discussion around the authenticity of Fragment 24, and his statement that Papias “made no mention of satan or demons”\(^{403}\) is something that simply cannot be known when most of his five-volume work is lost.

\(^{403}\) Burke 2015: 36.
In pleading ignorance as to what Polycarp meant by ‘devil’ and ‘Satan’, he allows his minimalistic presuppositions to govern his exegesis even in a text which explicitly mentions the two most common Satanological terms used in early Christianity! Furthermore, he fails to engage with several lines of literary- and tradition-historical evidence which help to illuminate what Polycarp meant by these terms.

If Burke’s treatment of Satan in the above texts leaves something to be desired, his discussion of 1Clement, 2Clement, and Martyrdom of Polycarp is unworthy of what purports to be a work of scholarship. In 1Clem 51.1 he challenges an overwhelming scholarly consensus concerning the referent of τοῦ ἀντικειμένου in a very superficial exegesis which shows no hint of actually investigating the background to this term, apart from a word search within the Greek NT. His discussion of 1Clem 3.4 has more merit, but he overstates the Satanological implications of this text. In 2Clem 18.2, he again challenges an overwhelming scholarly consensus and interprets ὁ διάβολος “as a referent to non-supernatural opposition”, offering no supporting evidence of any value.

*Martyrdom of Polycarp* is where the exegesis reaches its low point. Analyzing 2.4(3.1), he once again rejects an overwhelming scholarly consensus concerning the referent of ὁ διάβολος. His main evidence for his position is a text-critical argument which, even if valid, would not imply that ὁ διάβολος meant something other than ‘the devil’ here. His lexical analysis of the Satanological terminology used here and in 17.1 consists largely of a misinterpretation of 1Macc 1.36 whilst ignoring vast evidence from within earlier Christian writings. In 17.1, too, he rejects an overwhelming scholarly consensus. Here he focuses on a text-critical discussion concerning the following verses, which again has little bearing on the referent in 17.1, who is clearly described in mythological language apart from the Satanological terminology itself.

Coming now to Burke’s findings concerning other supernatural evil beings in the AF, he is able to identify silence where there is silence, but generally reads more from the silence than is warranted. This is particularly true in the case of Diognetus, where the writer explicitly states that he is omitting some of his ideas about idolatry.

Burke’s discussion of the false prophets passage in Did 11 is inadequate in that it implies that false prophets can say evil things in the Holy Spirit, an idea specifically repudiated by Paul. Burke once again cites a scholar (Tibbs) in support of his position who actually does not advocate his position. Burke generally neglects to take into account the parallels in Paul, John and Hermas that help to illuminate this passage.

Particularly puzzling here is Burke’s treatment of Papias. He acknowledges that Papias refers to fallen angels, but still classifies this work as ‘non-mythological’! And, as in the case of Satan, he positively asserts that Papias did not mention demons even though the great majority of his work is lost.

In the case of Barnabas, Burke states that this work never mentions demons, evidently overlooking the reference to demons in Barn 16.7.

In the case of Ignatius’ epistles, Burke ignores language about invisible beings, angels and rulers which clearly implies the existence of a spiritual realm inclusive of bad spirits. He is aware of two occurrences
of forms of the word δαιμόνιον but argues that the word does not mean ‘demon’ here but something closer to ‘ghost’. This is in spite of recent scholarship which has seen in this polemic a rhetorical reference to ‘demons’ as in the supernatural evil beings well known from other early Christian literature.

His discussion of Hermas, who has the most elaborate demonology among the AF, hinges largely on his assumption that by internalizing demons, evil spirits and angels, the writer has also denied them any external existence. He regards Hermas’ demonology as completely demythologized, ignoring scholars who caution against a reductionist approach to the tension between the literal and allegorical in Hermas’ pneumatology. His view of Hermas’ demonology also clashes with Hermas’ Satanology which, by his own admission, is mythological.

Finally, Burke makes a spirited attempt to squeeze an argument from silence out of a 49-word fragment from Quadratus’ lost apology. This makes for a good case study in poor exegetical method.

Again, we can emphasize that in his entire study Burke was unable to uncover even a hint of explicit antagonism toward belief in supernatural evil. Not a trace is left of the controversy which Burke thinks was raging in the early part of the second century between two opposing theological views, eventually leading to a paradigm shift in the church from a non-mythological to a mythological view of evil.

Burke concludes with a brief discussion of Christian writers after the AF. He introduces many new claims and ideas here which will not be assessed in detail. Briefly, Burke accuses mid- to late-second century apologists (such as Justin Martyr, Theophilus of Antioch and Tatian) with having “introduced new satanological ideas”. However, an alternative assessment is that they systematized existing ideas. Already within the NT, an identification is made between Satan and the serpent of Genesis, although the text does not elaborate. Within the NT writings, one finds the existence of Satan, demons and bad angels presupposed, and the Watchers myth is assumed, probably in three texts. There is also no question that some NT writers made use of apocryphal Jewish texts and traditions.

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404 Burke 2015: 41.
406 “Although the New Testament also identifies the devil and the serpent, it fails to offer any reason for Satan’s hostility against man” (Schultz 1978: 187).
407 “With the NT, especially with the Synoptic Gospels... we find key steps toward what will later be Christian demonology. All three Synoptic Gospels clearly identify demons with unclean or evil spirits. It is not certain that Mark and Luke equate Satan and the devil with Beelzebul. Matthew certainly does so (Matt 12:26-27)” (Martin 2010: 673). Again, as already cited in the introduction, “By combining these different references—the fall of Satan from Luke, with the reference to the devil and his angels from Matthew, with the Beelzebul story making Satan the ruler of demons—we come up with the different elements of the later belief that Satan is the prince of fallen angels who are identical with demons and who will all eventually be punished or destroyed. The Gospels do not say that demons are fallen angels, but we can see how later readers, combining the different accounts into one,
By the mid to late second century, as the Muratorian fragment implies, the Christian canon was beginning to take shape: the church had a new set of authoritative Scriptures in addition to the ‘Old Testament’. Again, these writings assumed the existence of supernatural evil beings, but did not theorize on their origin, nature, or the relationships between the various types of beings (if the distinctions were ever carefully defined). It is hardly surprising that Christian thinkers should systematize the ‘raw materials’ of NT Satanology and demonology. This was particularly true as second century Christians increasingly sought to compete in the intellectual marketplace: contrast the number of apologies written in the second century with the absence of this genre from the New Testament. Not that the Apologists were dealing with this subject at a purely intellectual level, of course. The intensity of persecution that the church faced during the second and third centuries must have fostered reflection about evil in a way which Western Christians today can hardly appreciate.

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408 “One is not surprised to find a pronounced dualism in the thought of the Church Fathers. For their basic source, the New Testament, is pervaded by this spirit. Few of the personalities we shall meet, diverse as they were in background and temperament, failed to devote much attention to Satan, his past history and present enterprises, to evil angels and wicked spirits. These matters, derived from Jewish apocalyptic and elaborated in the Christian Scriptures, were developed still further by the scholars of the Church.” (Bamberger 1952/2010: 73-74). “The early Christians seem to have known the tale of the angels who consorted with the daughters of men, as told in the Book of Enoch. But aside from two New Testament references already quoted [2Pet. 2:4; Jude 6], the matter is not discussed till we come to Justin Martyr, in the middle of the second century.” (Bamberger 1952/2010: 74)

409 1Pet. 3:19; 2Pet. 2:4; Jude 6. “The widespread influence of early Enochic pseudepigrapha can be inferred from the presence of explicit references to the writings of Enoch in Second Temple Jewish and New Testament literature (e.g., Jub. 4, esp. 4.17-19; T. Sim. 5.4; T. Levi 10.5, 14.1; T. Dan 5.6; T. Naph. 4.1; T. Benj. 9.1; Jude 14-15), and the popularity of the Book of the Watchers in particular is suggested by the many allusions to its version of the angelic descent myth (esp. Jude 6 and 2 Pet 2.9-10).” (Reed 2004: 143)

410 E.g., Jude 9, 14-15; probably Jas 4:5; Heb. 11:37; 2Tim. 3:8. “The New Testament authors transmitted to their vast audience many of the ideas that we have discovered in the Jewish Outside Books – books with which the early Christian thinkers were well acquainted. Certain trends, notably the trend toward a mythological dualism, which appear sporadically and tentatively in the pre-Christian literature of Israel, recur in more developed and systematic form in the New Testament literature.” (Bamberger 1952/2010: 61)

411 See Hill (1995) on the debate around the dating of this fragment.

412 “Unlike the apocryphal literature of the period, however, there is very little theorizing about the origin and nature of demons in the early Christian literature, even though their existence is assumed throughout it” (Boyd 1975: 45).

413 “In trying to tell the Christian story, the church fathers were also trying to construct a coherent mythological and theological system with which to oppose their various rivals, whether pagan, Gnostic, or Manichaean” (Forsyth 1989: 5).

414 “The specific objection [Justin] addresses is the issue of how Christians can claim that God is ‘our helper’ when, in fact, they are being viciously ‘oppressed and persecuted.’ Reflecting the warfare worldview of the New Testament, Justin’s answer is that this persecution is to be expected, for the world has been besieged by fallen angels and demons” (Boyd 2001: 45). For other social context for the Apologists’ mythology, see Pagels (1985).
Appendix: The Ascension of Isaiah

The Ascension of Isaiah is a pseudepigraphic work which was formerly regarded as consisting of an earlier Jewish work (referred to as the Martyrdom of Isaiah, chapters 1-5 except for 3.13-4.18), a fragment of the Testament of Hezekiah (3.13-4.18), and the Ascension of Isaiah proper (chapters 6-11). The latter two were regarded as Christian compositions.

As highlighted by Bauckham, there has been a revolution in scholarship on this work since 1980 which has overturned the older view and established that the Ascension of Isaiah in its entirety is a Christian composition (though Stuckenbruck notes that it does draw heavily on Jewish tradition). Bauckham regards the entire text as a unified work from a single author written between 70-80 A.D. Accordingly, he calls for an end to the neglect of this work in New Testament scholarship.

However, Knight (2015) notes that most scholars have followed the view of Norelli who argued that the Ascension of Isaiah contains two distinct constituent parts – chapters 6-11 being written first and chapters 1-5 later being added. Knight summarizes the current scholarly consensus as to dating:

This research shows that the date of the apocalypse is now agreed within relatively close parameters. This consensus was reinforced at the very welcome conference which Tobias Nicklas organized in Regensburg in March 2013. The dominant view is that the apocalypse contains some first-century material, and that this first-century element is given by the substance of chs. 6-11. It is disputed whether the material in chs. 1-5 comes from the first or the second century CE, the greater weight of scholarship preferring the second century.

The Ascension of Isaiah was previously assumed to reflect a Docetic Christology, but this has been challenged in recent scholarship which regards it as being in line with proto-orthodox Christology.

The relevance of the Ascension of Isaiah to this study lies in its parallels to certain Satanological ideas in the Apostolic Fathers (and NT). Parallels between the Didache’s brief apocalypse and AscenIs 3-4 have already been noted. More broadly, although not grouped with the Apostolic Fathers, AscenIs is an important witness to Christian Satanology in the late first and early second centuries. Both sections contain numerous references to Satan which are unquestionably mythological and help to illuminate some of the terminology used in the New Testament and Apostolic Fathers. These terms include ‘Satan’ (2.2; 2.7; 5.16; 7.9; 11.23-24; 11.41; 11.43; cf. numerous references in NT), ‘Beliar’ (1.8-9; 2.4; 3.11; 3.13; 4.2ff; 4.14-18; 5.1; 5.15; cf. 2Cor. 6:15), Satan mentioned with ‘his angels’ or ‘his hosts’ (1.3; 2.2; 4.14; 7.9; cf. Matt. 25:41; 2Cor. 12:7; Rev. 12:7-9; Barn 18.1), the god of that/this world (9.14; plural in 10.12; 11.16; cf. 2Cor. 4:4), the ruler of this world (1.3; 10.29; cf. John 12:31; 14:30; 16:11; IgnEph 17.1; 19.1; IgnMag 1.2; IgnTral 4.2; IgnRom 7.1; IgnPhld 6.2), the air or firmament as Satan’s dwelling-place (7.9; 10.29; cf. Eph. 2:2), and the adversary (11.19; cf. 1Tim. 5:14; 1Clem 51.1; MartPol 17.1).
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